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ABSTRACT
RECEIVER DESIGN AND SECURITY FOR LOW POWER
WIRELESS COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS
SEPTEMBER 2014
KYLE ANDREWMORRISON
B.Sc., RENSSELAER POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Dennis L. Goeckel
This dissertation focuses on two important areas in wireless communications:
receiver design and security. In the first part of this dissertation we consider low
data rate receiver design for ultra-wideband (UWB), a wideband radio technology
that promises to help solve the frequency allocation problem that often inhibits
narrowband systems. Reference-based receivers are promising candidates in the
UWB regime, because the conventional rake receiver designs suffers from com-
plexity limitations and inaccuracies in channel estimation. Many reference-based
systems have arisen as viable solutions for receivers. We unify these systems as
well as other systems into the general framework for performance analysis to sug-
gest the optimal system for varying constraints. We improve the performance of
frequency-shifted reference (FSR-UWB) for an average power constraint by halv-
ing the frequency offset and employing a sample-and-hold approach across the
frame period. Also, we introduce a novel peak mitigation technique; tone reser-
vi
vation, for the multi-differential (MD) version of FSR-UWB, to reduce the high
peak-to-average power ratio observed as the data carriers increase.
The next part of this dissertation is about wireless security which is ubiquitous
in modern news. Cryptography is widely use for security but it assumes limited
computational abilities of an eavesdropper, is based on the unproven hardness
of the underlying primitives, and allows for the message to be recorded and de-
crypted later. In this dissertation we consider an information-theoretic security ap-
proach to guaranteeing everlasting secrecy. We contribute a new secrecy rate pair
outage formulation, where an outage event is based on the instantaneous rates
of the destination and the eavesdropper being below and above desired thresh-
olds, respectively. In our new secrecy rate pair outage formulation, two new unac-
counted outage events emerge: secrecy breach, where the eavesdropper is above
the targeted threshold; unreliable, where the destination is unable to successfully
decode the message. The former case must be carefully avoided, while for the
latter case we can exploit automatic retransmissions (ARQ) while maintaining the
eavesdropper intercept probability below the target threshold. We look at both
“simple” receivers and also complex receivers that use a buffer to store previous
messages to maximally combine signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). Then we extend these
results to the two-hop case where we maximize the end-to-end secure throughput
by optimizing the intercept probability at each eavesdropper given a total end-
to-end intercept constraint. Lastly, we consider the difficult case in information-
theoretic security: the near eavesdropper case, where we contribute an optimal
power allocation algorithm that leverages nearby chatter nodes to generate noise
to reduce the probability of intercept by the eavesdropper while minimally im-
peding the source-to-destination communication. As shown in both one-hop and
two-hop cases, allowing a slight outage at the destination for cases of when the
eavesdropper is above a specific threshold greatly improves secrecy performance.
vii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Wireless communication is widely employed because of its flexibility and ease
of use, in particular allowingmobility of the users. Advancements in wireless com-
munications have focused on reliability, robustness, speed, minimizing cost and
power. Recently, ultra-wideband (UWB) was seen as an emerging area in wireless
communication; in this dissertation, we provide a comprehensive framework for
low-to-moderate data rate reference-based UWB systems. We consider the com-
parison of reference-based UWB systems under various constraints, optimizing
frequency shifted reference (FSR-UWB) for an average power constraint and then
themulti-data version of FSR-UWB (multi-differential (MD-FSR)) for a peak power
constraint.
More recently, an area in wireless communications that has attracted signifi-
cant interest is security, in particular physical-layer security. Security is a vital con-
cern because information intercepted can have a damaging effect on users, such as
identity theft, ruined reputation, revenue lost and stolen intelligence. Hence it is
very important to formulate a secure system that guarantees everlasting protection
from an eavesdropper. This dissertation considers new secrecy outage formula-
tions involving jamming and automatic request retransmission (ARQ) techniques
that help improve reliability and security in wireless communication systems. We
will consider the case of when the eavesdropper uses a complex receiver, where
it buffers previous transmissions and soft combines for an additional advantage
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at intercepting the message. Also we consider the difficult problem of the “near
eavesdropper” case, optimally allocating power to chattering nodes and optimiz-
ing the outage constraint at the destination to further reduce the end-to-end inter-
cept probability constraint.
1.1.1 Ultra-wideband
Frequency allocation for the wide bandwidths required for very high data rates
or accurate positioning systems has been a growing concern in wireless communi-
cation. The scarcity in available contiguous frequency for such is one of the main
motivations for ultra-wideband (UWB). UWB has the ability to co-exist with other
technologies because its signal energy is spread over a larger bandwidth than nar-
rowband systems, and its interference to other more narrowband systems that oc-
cupy the same frequency band is minimal due to its low spectral density. Thus,
in 2002 the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) designated the 3.1− 10.6
Ghz spectrum for UWB radio applications, where the bandwidth of the system is at
least 20% of the center frequency or larger than 500 Mhz. Because of the extremely
large bandwidth of UWB, an added advantage is diversity against multipath, and
the ability to carry very high date rates. Hence, UWB communication systems have
been considered for standardization for short range low-power wireless commu-
nications in both high data rate (IEEE 802.15.3 [1]) and low-to-moderate data rate
(IEEE 802.15.4a [2]) applications.
However the large bandwidth increases the receiver complexity because of the
large number of resolvable paths as well as the precision required for channel esti-
mation. Hence, standard coherent rake receivers [3] become infeasible. This moti-
vated researchers to look into other receiver alternatives, mainly noncoherent sys-
tems. The initial noncoherent system proposed was Transmitted-Reference (TR)
[4]. TR-UWB was an attractive alternative to the traditional rake receiver design
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but was not readily accepted because of the inability to build a wideband delay
line in integrated circuits. To address this problem, Frequency Shifted Reference
(FSR)-UWB [5] was introduced, where translation is done in the frequency do-
main rather than the time domain, in which case the delay line can be replaced by
a mixer. During the FSR-UWB prototype construction [6], the undergraduate team
that built the FSR-UWB prototype recognized that the sinusoid that separated the
reference and data waveforms could be replaced with a square wave, which re-
sults in pulse position modulation (PPM)-UWB. This observation led to the first
framework of simple reference-based systems [7]. Independently researchers pro-
posed Code Shifted Reference (CSR)-UWB [8] and Code-Multiplexed (CM)-UWB
[9], which use orthogonal codes to represent the data and reference signals.
In this dissertation we first contribute an extension to the framework of [7].
Reference-based systems, including multi-data and multi-user systems, are put
into a unified framework, and performance analysis is done to obtain the potential
optimal set of waveforms as well as to help aid in comparison of the well-known
systems. This framework indicates the choice of constraint has a significant impact
on the choice of the number frames per bit, which is a critical parameter when
considering reference-based systems. We optimize under two constraints:
1. Average power: We optimize reference-based systems under an average power
constraint, restricting to a small number of frames per bit. This optimization
leads to burst mode PPM as the optimal performing waveform given an av-
erage power constraint, indicating FSR-UWB has worse performance than
PPM-UWB and CSR/CM-UWB. Therefore two solutions were sought to im-
prove FSR-UWB system performance :
(a) A sample-and-hold technique was used across each frame to minimize
signal degradation, as discussed in detail in Chapter 2.
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(b) We noted that the frequency offset between the data and reference signal
can be halved, thus reducing the slight degradation that occurs as the
data rate approaches the coherence frequency of the channel.
These above solutions led to enhanced system performance for FSR-UWB,
very comparable to PPM-UWB.
2. Peak power: Peak power is of great concern in low-power integrated circuitry
for a UWB transmitter [10]. Similar to the average power case, we optimized
under the general framework for reference-based systems and determined
the optimal waveforms under a peak power constraint. For a large number
of frames FSR-UWB showed promising performance especially as the data
rate increases (multi-differential (MD)-FSR), but, as the number of frames
increase, it can introduce high inter-frame interference (IFI). We established
a peak mitigation technique for MD-FSR under the following constraints:
(a) Does not reduce the data rate.
(b) Does not increase complexity and affect system performance.
The solution under these constraints yields a tone reservation tactic similar to
that from orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), where addi-
tional peak reduction carriers are used to alleviate the peak-to-average power
ratio (PAPR) of the transmitted signal. Because of the unusual constraints on
the data rate of the MD-FSR-UWB system, there is no loss in data rate due to
tone reservation as in a standard OFDM system.
1.1.2 Physical Layer Secrecy
The wireless communication medium makes it very susceptible to eavesdrop-
pers (unintended receivers). Traditionalmethods to alleviate the issues of an eaves-
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dropper are done using some form of cryptography, with a private key exchange
between the intended users that is unknown to all unintended users.
A strong advantage of physical layer security is that it does not rely on lim-
ited computational abilities of the eavesdropper; rather, it relies on the physical
channel quality, as the secrecy capacity is given by the difference in the capacities
between the main channel and the eavesdropper channel. However, on wireless
communication channels, the randomness of the fading gains makes it impossible
to guarantee secrecy over every instantiation of the fading, hence motivating the
concept of secrecy outage. The instantaneous capacity is defined as the maximum
rate of information that can be reliably transmitted between Alice and Bob con-
ditioned on the fading, noted as RB; likewise, between Alice and Eve, RE. The
secrecy outage is generally defined as the probability the instantaneous secrecy ca-
pacity (RS = RB − RE), the difference between the instantaneous capacity of the
Alice and Bob (RB) channel and that of the Alice and Eve (RE) channel, is less than
the targeted secrecy rate (R0) [11, 12].
Hence for a secure system, the standard definition states that secrecy is achieved
when the secrecy rate (RS) is above the designed secrecy rate (RS ≥ R0). How-
ever, this construction is flawed: the wiretap construction [13] requires a rate pair
(RB, RE), and there does not exist a universal rate pair that guarantees secrecy over
the whole targeted secure region. This motivates the definition of two hazardous
regions that are unaccounted for in the standard formulation: the region where
RE0, the target eavesdropper rate is above RE, where secrecy is compromised; and
RB0, where the target destination rate is below RB and the system is unreliable. In
this dissertation we offer a tighter definition of secrecy outage and form a different
secrecy outage formulation, where we consider not only choosing a target secrecy
rate that represents the difference between the main channel and eavesdropper
channel, but rather the choice of two individual target secrecy rates.
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1. Rather than one degree of freedom, R0, as in the outage formulation shown
in, for example, [11], we introduce two degrees of freedom (RB0, RE0) for
a system not to be an outage; in other words, Bob must be able to decode
the message while Eve is unable to decode the message. The secrecy out-
age definition of [11] is sufficient if RB or RE is known, in which case the
choice of R0 fixes the other rate (RE0 or RB0, respectively) and hence speci-
fies the pair, in which case our definition is equivalent to the prior definition.
However, if neither RB nor RE is known (i.e no channel state information at
the transmitter [11, pg 199]), then we would argue that a stricter definition
is required. Interception of the message (RE > RE0) is more important than
simply the dropping of the packet (RB < RB0, in which retransmission can be
employed). In particular, we can exploit the use of automatic repeat request
(ARQ) schemes [14], keeping the eavesdropper intercept probability below
the outage constraint while maximizing throughput to the destination. This
dissertation explores two widely used hybrid ARQ systems: basic hybrid
ARQ, where there is no memory and the receiver only provides the source
with a single bit of feedback telling whether the packet was receive correctly,
and hybrid ARQ with soft combining, where the receiver also buffers recep-
tions and uses packet combining over multiple transmissions to increase the
SNR of the received message.
2. In addition, we consider the case where there are other nodes (relay or noise
generators) in the network outside of the source, destination and eavesdrop-
per. We introduce a protocol where system nodes that are not employed
as relay nodes and that have a bad channel to the receiver (and hence will
not interfere significantly with the message transmission), transmit random
noise (chatter) to confuse the eavesdropper. Given channel state informa-
tion between all pairs of system nodes, it is possible to keep the destination
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out of outage if the aggregate chatterer power impinging on the receiver is
constrained. This forms a constraint on the chatterer power, and we then in-
vestigate the optimal allocation of this power budget to the noise generating
nodes, which we call “chattering nodes”, with the goal of maximally degrad-
ing the eavesdropper signal. More formally, we guarantee a desired signal-
to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the destination while maximizing
the probability that the eavesdropper cannot meet its (often lower) SINR
threshold. The problem formulation leads to a water-filling result, where we
allot power to chatterer nodes that are close to the eavesdropper and far from
the destination, or whose signal will be badly faded when it arrives at the
destination.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Ultra-wideband
The first wireless systemswere at line of sight distances via smoke signals, torch
signaling, flash mirrors, signal flares or semaphore flags (rudimentary signals). In
1838 Samuel Morse contributed the Telegraph Network, and eventually the tele-
phone network replaced the telegraph network. In 1895, Marconi demonstrated
the first radio transmission from Isle of Wight to Tugboat, a distance of approxi-
mately 18 miles, thus giving birth to radio communications. The most important
factors in radio technology are: transmission of information over large distances,
better quality, minimum power, small and cheap devices.
One of the most successful application of wireless networking is the cellular
telephone system. In 1915 the first voice transmission between New York and San
Francisco was demonstrated. Gradually in 1946, the cellular system was made
public across 25 cities in the U.S. Unfortunately due to inefficient use of the radio
spectrum, the system capacity was limited. For example, 30 years into the matura-
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tion of the technology, there was only support for approximately 543 users. Then,
later in the 50′s and 60′s AT&T Bell labs exploited the fact that the power of the
transmitted signal falls off with distance, allowing multiple users to communicate
at the same frequency at spatially separate locations with minimal interference,
and thus greatly improving efficient spectrum use. In modern communications,
technology such as code division multiple access (CDMA) has helped greatly to
advance cellular technology. Frequency allocation is a major concern in narrow
band systems because of the limited availability of bandwidth. In 2002 UWB, a
wideband technology was proposed as a solution to resolve the frequency alloca-
tion problem. UWB was defined as unallocated frequency spectrum in 3.1− 10.6
GHz in the U.S.A.with a power limit of 41.3dBm/MHz, operating in the noise floor
and coexisting with narrowband systems. UWB offers many advantages such as
higher data rate, multi users, fine time resolution, and high performance in a mul-
tipath environment. However building a wideband receiver is no trivial task.
The natural approach to UWB receiver design is to apply a rake receiver similar
to that seen in traditional wideband wireless systems. But, because UWB systems
spread energy over a large bandwidth, a rake receiver implementation is difficult
because of the channel estimation required to support a large number of taps [3]. In
addition, these taps come at the high price in circuit area and complexity [15]. This
motivated further research for an alternative receiver design with low complexity
[16].
An early solution offered was the transmitted reference (TR-UWB) system [4,
17]. In a UWB system, a symbol period is generally divided into some number
of frames, each containing a single UWB pulse. In the original TR-UWB system,
two pulses are transmitted per frame: a reference pulse and a data pulse. These
pulses are separated by a known delay, generally selected to be larger than the de-
lay spread of the channel. The relative polarity of the reference and data pulses
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indicates the information bit: the bit is 0 if they have the same polarity and 1 if
there polarity differs. Since the reference and data go through approximately the
same channel, the reference serves as a noisy template for the channel distorted
data signal. Correlation is conceptually simple at the receiver, hence allowing for
efficient collection of the received signal energy. However, a wideband delay ele-
ment is required, which is difficult to implement in low power integrated circuits
[18].
An alternative receiver to the traditional rake receiver design and transmitted
reference is frequency shifted reference (FSR)-UWB [7], where, instead of offset-
ting the data and reference signals in the time domain, translation is done in the
frequency domain. An advantage of FSR is that a delay element is not required at
the receiver, but instead a mixer is used.
Independently, research teams motivated by the FSR-UWB scheme proposed
more general square-wave approaches: code-shifted reference (CSR)-UWB by Nie
and Chen [8], and code-multiplexed reference (CM)-UWB by DAmico and Men-
gali [9]. In these schemes, rather than separating the reference and data with a
frequency shift, the reference and data signals are modulated with unique code se-
quences from the rows of a Hadamard matrix and thus are offset by an orthogonal
code shift. There are many possible code combinations between reference and data
signal that maintain orthogonality but, for the single user case, choosing the opti-
mal set of codes yields a system similar to the standardized 802.15.4a [2] version
of pulse position modulation (PPM-UWB) [2].
In [19], multiple carriers, each carrying data differentially encoded relative to
a single reference (called multi-differential (MD)), are employed. Orthogonality is
preserved since the frequency offsets are well below the channel coherence band-
width. This allows a strong reference with cost amortized over a number of data
bits, which improves the performance of each of the data streams. In particular, if
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K data signals are transmitted over K orthogonal carrier frequencies, MD-FSR has
a 5 log10 K dB gain in performance in terms of average signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
over standard single-differential (SD) FSR; in the limit of large K, the reference be-
comes essentially noiseless, thereby eliminating the dominating noise cross noise
term of reference-based systems and leading to a system whose performance is
only a fixed energy loss worse than the coherent system whose implementation
has proven so difficult [19].
The systems discussed above represent a small class of the possible waveforms
for separating the reference from the data which can be used for a reference-based
system. In a unified framework, performance analysis is done to obtain the po-
tential optimal set of waveforms as well as to help aid in comparison of the well
known systems. However, while considering this comparison, one thing that has
become apparent is that the constraints under which systems are compared must
be carefully considered. Hints of this dependence can be seen in the differing com-
parisons of [7], where FSR-UWB has shown to have optimality properties, for a
large number of frames and [9], where CM-UWB was shown to significantly out-
perform FSR-UWB for a small number of frames.
1.2.2 Physical Layer Secrecy
Wireless communications is often preferred over wired communications be-
cause of scalability of installation, flexibility of setup, multi-user support and mo-
bility. Contrary to wired communications where the signal is constrained to a wire
or cable, in wireless communications the signal is broadcast over the air. Hence,
the advantages wireless communications provides in flexibility and ease of use are
also what makes it vulnerable because of the ease of unintended access to the sig-
nal by nearby nodes. Moreover systems such as the internet connect more than a
billion devices in a network built with security as an afterthought.
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The vulnerabilities and security holes, for example, of the internet stem from
the fact of its fast growth. The system was first built for academic researchers and
created an intimate environment for trusted individuals to share and access infor-
mation and applications quickly. However the internet has grown to billions of
users, and has evolved from its original intent, became a billion dollar business
with commercial players, allowing for such services such as Electronic commerce
(E-commerce), electronic mail (email) and the World Wide Web (WWW). In [20]
it was shown that 47% of U.S. adults had their personal information exposed by
hackers (eavesdroppers). For example, 70 million of Target customers’ personal
information, credit card and debit card information was stolen, and similar events
happened with 33 million Adobe user credentials, 4.6 million Snapchat users’ ac-
count data, and AOL’s 120 million account holders. Another prominent attack
“Heartbleed”, which exploited a software bug in the OpenSSL cryptographic soft-
ware library and forced computers to divulge secret information stored, has af-
fected millions of people. Thus there needs to be systems and protocols in place so
that we can make communications secure.
Security started out as an afterthought in the construction of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) (7-layer) model. However, in Internet applications security
became a necessity because of the rise of malicious users. The network layer was
identified as the place to handle security via cryptography. A commonly used ex-
ample of cryptography is the source and destination establishing a key over an
insecure channel, for example, via a Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [21].
The eavesdropper is at a significant computational disadvantage to decode the
message because he/she does not know the secret integers chosen by the source
and destination. Thus, cryptography assumes an eavesdropper can perfectly lis-
ten to the message but its computational abilities restrict it from correctly decoding
the message; hence, eavesdroppers near the source are thwarted, which is of great
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value in the wireless environment. However if an eavesdropper has infinite com-
putational abilities or stores the message for later decryption, security might be
compromised.
Shannon [22] presented secrecy from an information-theoretic and physical
layer background where he first considered transmission over a noiseless chan-
nel. Shannon’s work assumes the adversary has perfect reception of the message
and infinite computational abilities. In this case, he concluded (quite negatively)
that secrecy required a key as long as the message. In a continuation of Shannon’s
work, Wyner considered secrecy over a noisy channel and introduced the wiretap
channel [13].
In the wiretap code construction, the secrecy capacity is of great importance,
as it provides a measure of the amount of information that can be communicated
securely: the difference in the capacities between the main channel (RB) and the
eavesdropper channel (RE) [11], [23, 24]. Since the channel is wireless, the stochas-
tic nature of the fading channel makes it impossible to guarantee secrecy over ev-
ery instantiation of the fading motivating the concept of outage probability, the
probability the instantaneous secrecy capacity (RS = RB − RE), the difference be-
tween the instantaneous capacity of the Alice and Bob (RB) channel and that of
the Alice and Eve (RE) channel, is less than the targeted secrecy rate (R0) [11, 12].
Hence for a secure system, secrecy is achieved when the secrecy rate (RS) is above
the designed secrecy rate (RS ≥ R0).
The wiretap code construction can achieve positive secrecy if the channel from
Alice to Bob is better than Alice to Eve. But, if the channel from the source to the
eavesdropper is better than the Alice to Bob, then secrecy may not be achievable,
which can occur in wireless systems if the eavesdropper is close to the source (the
“near eavesdropper” problem). One solution offered to the near eavesdropper
problem was noise forwarding [25], where relay nodes send dummy codewords
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independent of the source message to confuse the eavesdropper. Another solution
offered was cooperative jamming [26], where nodes not used in the relay transmis-
sion of the message but in close proximity to the eavesdropper introduce artificial
random noise to degrade the message received at the eavesdropper. Contrary to
noise forwarding, cooperative jamming allows the relay to harm the eavesdrop-
per more than it harms the receiver. In [26], it was shown that a non-zero rate of
secrecy can be achieved regardless of the eavesdropper location. In [27], cooper-
ative jamming techniques that introduce artificial noise are again used to achieve
secrecy.
1.3 Contributions
1.3.1 Ultra-wideband
1. Generalized framework for noncoherent UWB systems is introduced: Aunified per-
formance analysis is performed to show how systems perform under a peak
constraint system (large number of frames), and an average power constraint
(small number of frames) and suggests optimality properties to guide system
design.
• Improving FSR-UWB: FSR-UWB suffers in performance when a small
number of frames is considered (average power constraint). There are
two solutions to improve system performance:
(a) FSR suffers degradation in comparison to other reference-based sys-
tems because of a cosine term in the bit error rate performance. A
solution used here was to sample the envelope at the beginning of
each frame and hold that sample across the frame period, hence
making it constant over the frame period. Thismodified FSR scheme
improves performance at low-to-moderate SNRs, but can demon-
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strate significant error floors due to waveform distortion at higher
SNRs.
(b) As investigated in detail in [5], the frequency offset causes a perfor-
mance degradation as the data rate approaches the coherence fre-
quency of the channel. In [28], it is noted that the frequency offset of
FSR-UWB can be halved to address this latter concern. The halved
frequency offset scheme reduces the degradation of FSR-UWB and
system performance is close to those seen in CSR/CM-UWB.
• System Performance: For a peak power constraint (large Nf ), our analysis
and [7] suggest a broad autocorrelation function Rφk(τ) of the separat-
ing waveform would correspond with improved system performance.
In the case of binary CM-UWB, as considered in [9], the optimal sepa-
rating waveform corresponds to the burst-mode PPM, and is arrived at
through a different derivation in [9]. Systems underneath a peak power
constraint which corresponds to a large Nf have similar performance,
and thus for the binary case, conclude that ease of implementation is
the key differentiator. This points to CM/CSR-UWB approaches, which
avoid not only the delay lines of TR-UWB but also the amplitude mod-
ulation of FSR-UWB.
• Peak mitigation for multi data rate systems: Peak power is of great concern
for multi-data rate UWB systems, especially as the number of carriers
get large, similar to that seen in OFDM systems. A commonly used
technique in OFDM to alleviate this problem is tone reservation, where
some of the carriers (tones) are reserved for peak reduction rather than
carrying data, and the signal peak can be reduced by the selection of
appropriate values on the reserved tones. It is important to note that the
carriers do not affect the signal detection performance because they are
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orthogonal to each other, but in OFDM the cost of applying tone reser-
vation is a reduced data rate because the peak reduction carrying signals
are interleaved with data carrying signals. We introduced peak mitiga-
tion alternatives that do not restrict the data rate and are effective for
reference-based systems, most notably for the multiple data carrier ver-
sion of frequency-shifted reference based system. The MD-FSR system
was improved using tone reservation where peaky data signals were
alleviated by peak reducing signals above the coherence frequency of
the channel, thus causing no reduction of the data rate. Such peak mit-
igation techniques lead to small PAPR gains of frequency-shifted ref-
erence UWB versus code-multiplexed and code-shifted reference UWB
systems.
1.3.2 Physical Layer Security
1. Secrecy Rate Pair Outage Formulation: A new outage formulation was con-
tributed where we consider wiretap rate pair design under the secrecy rate
pair outage constraint, maintaining separate rate thresholds for the channels
to each of the destination (Bob) and eavesdropper (Eve).
• ARQ Design: We designed an ARQ scheme to maximize throughput to
Bob while constraining the intercept probability at Eve, while account-
ing for her ability to intercept the packet on the first or any retransmis-
sion (or, in the case of soft combining, some combination of the initial
transmission and retransmissions).
• Relay Node with ARQ: Thus far most work has consider the single hop
case. A two-hop network is also of great importance, where a source
node passes the message to a relay node, and the relay node passes the
message to the destination. Differently from the single-hop network,
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the relay node adds signal diversity, which is very important in physi-
cal layer wireless security. We extend our one-hop secrecy rate pair con-
struction to the two-hop case: we place a secrecy constraint on the end-
to-end intercept probability by Eve, while maximizing the end-to-end
throughput. Also, we consider the optimal distribution of the end-to-
end secrecy constraint to each link to maximize the secure throughput.
2. Optimal Power Allocation of Jammers: In the case of Eve, with a high intercept
probability, jamming techniques via noise generating nodes are used to in-
hibit Eve’s reception. Optimal power allocation to the systems nodes that
generate random chatter can be achieved via a water- filling approach. In this
scenario we consider the optimal allocation of this power budget to the noise
generating nodes, with the goal of maximally degrading the eavesdropper
signal. More formally, we guarantee a desired signal-to-interference plus
noise ratio (SINR) at the destination while maximizing the probability that
the eavesdropper cannot meet its (often lower) SINR threshold.
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CHAPTER 2
REFERENCE-BASED ULTRA-WIDEBAND (UWB) RADIO
Ultra-wideband (UWB) radio is promising for localization and wireless com-
munication, but receiver implementation difficulties due to the enormous band-
width have slowed development of the technology. The first proposed reference-
based system was the transmitted reference (TR)-UWB architecture, but TR-UWB
is plagued by the difficulty in building an extremely wideband delay line in small
integrated circuits. This difficulty lead to frequency shifted reference (FSR)-UWB,
where signal translation at the receiver is done in the frequency domain with
a mixer rather than the time domain via a wideband delay element. The FSR-
UWB system further motivated code-shifted (CS) and code-multiplexed (CM) sys-
tems, where separation is done in the code domain with orthogonal binary codes,
thereby removing the amplitude modulation required in the FSR-UWB system.
In this Chapter we incorporate all of these architectures into one general frame-
work, and introduce a peak mitigation technique similar to the tone reservation
scheme employed in orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems
but without the cost in data rate. A comparison of reference-based systems under
either peak or average power constraints is presented.
2.1 Introduction
First introduced in 2002, coexisting with narrowband systems that include GPS,
IEEE 802.11 (WLAN), the FCC allocated 3.1− 10.1 GHz to ultra-wideband (UWB)
communications to help solve frequency allocation problems that inhibit wireless
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communications. UWB transmission is defined as a signal bandwidth that exceeds
the lesser of 500 MHz or 20% of the center frequency. The transmit signal of UWB
systems are low-power ultra-short information-bearing pulses, where signals must
operate at the noise floor of other narrowband systems that occupy the band; thus,
the power level must be below −41.3 dBm.
UWB systems provide a viable solution for common problems facing short-
range, low-power wireless communications systems. In particular, UWB offers
many potential advantages over conventional technology, since its extremely large
bandwidth promises transmission at higher date rates, low cost and duty cycle, fre-
quency diversity for combating multipath, and a high multi-user capacity. UWB
is a compelling approach for localization because of its fine time resolution which
can lead to accurate asset tracking and precession navigation. Another applica-
tion of interest is in networking for short-range, high-speed access to the internet,
where UWB can be a physical layer candidate for Wireless Personal Area Network
(WPAN). And UWB can be employed in sensor networks where energy is often
limited. These are just a few of the endless opportunities of UWB. Hence, UWB
communication systems have been considered for standardization for short range
low-power wireless communications in both high data rate (IEEE 802.15.3) and
low-to-moderate data rate (IEEE 802.15.4a) applications.
UWB offers a number of system design advantages that include: free of sine
wave carriers, does not require Intermediate Frequency (IF) processing, and op-
erates at baseband. However, a big challenge is transmitter design. The pulse
of choice is the Gaussian pulse mainly because it has the smallest possible time-
bandwidth product of 0.5, which maximizes the range-rate solution, and is readily
available from the antenna pattern.
The natural approach to UWB receiver design is to apply a rake receiver simi-
lar to that seen in traditional wideband wireless systems. In a rake receiver design,
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signal energy can be collected from various multipath branches, where each cal-
culate path delays and amplitude distortions so that you can combine SNR from
each path to coherently make a decision on the received signals. But, because UWB
systems spread energy over a large bandwidth, a rake receiver implementation is
difficult because of the channel estimation required to support a large number of
taps [3, 29]. In addition, these taps come at the high price in circuit area and com-
plexity [15] for small power limited devices. This motivated further research for
an alternative receiver design with low complexity [16].
An early solution offered was the transmitted reference (TR-UWB) system [4,
17, 30, 31, 32]. In a low-power UWB system, a symbol period is generally divided
into some number of frames, each containing a single UWB pulse. In the original
TR-UWB system, two pulses are transmitted per frame: a reference pulse and a
data pulse. These pulses are separated by a known delay, generally selected to be
larger than the delay spread of the channel. The relative polarity of the reference
and data pulses indicates the information bit: the bit is 0 if they have the same
polarity and 1 if their polarity differs. Since the reference and data go through
approximately the same channel, the reference serves as a noisy template for the
channel distorted data signal. Correlation is conceptually simple at the receiver,
the received signal is multiplied by a delayed version of itself over the symbol
interval, hence allowing for efficient collection of the received signal energy. How-
ever, a wideband delay element is required, which is difficult to implement in low
power integrated circuits [18].
An alternative receiver to the traditional rake receiver design and transmitted
reference is frequency shifted reference (FSR-UWB) [5], where, instead of offset-
ting the data and reference signals in the time domain, translation is done in the
frequency domain. An advantage of FSR is that a delay element is not required
at the receiver, but instead a mixer is used. An undergraduate team implemented
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a FSR-UWB prototype [6], where they recognized that the sinusoid separating the
reference and data signals could be replaced by a square wave. The result is a sys-
tem that has energy in either the first half of the symbol interval or second half of
the symbol interval, called ”burst-mode” pulse-position modulation (PPM), hence
being similar to the proposed 802.15.4a standard [2]. This observation led to the
general framework for simple reference based systems in [7]. Independently, re-
search teams motivated by the FSR-UWB scheme proposed more general square-
wave approaches: code-shifted reference UWB (CSR-UWB) by Nie and Chen [8],
and code-multiplexed reference UWB (CM-UWB) by D’Amico and Mengali [9].
In these schemes, rather than separating the reference and data with a frequency
shift, the reference and data signals are modulated with unique code sequences
from the rows of a Hadamard matrix and thus are offset by an orthogonal code
shift. There are many possible code combinations between reference and data sig-
nal that maintain orthogonality but, for the single-user case, choosing the optimal
set of codes yields again a system similar to the standardized 802.15.4a version of
pulse position modulation (PPM-UWB) [9].
Some of the most promising extensions to FSR-UWB for improving perfor-
mance versus an average power constraint suffer under a peak power constraint,
most notably [33] and [34]. In [34], multiple carriers, each carrying data differ-
entially encoded relative to a single reference (called multi-differential (MD)), are
employed. Orthogonality is preserved since the frequency offsets are well below
the channel coherence bandwidth. This allows a strong reference with cost amor-
tized over a number of data bits, which improves the performance of each of the
data streams. In particular, if K data signals are transmitted over K orthogonal
carrier frequencies, MD-FSR has a 5 log10 K dB gain in performance in terms of av-
erage signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) over standard single-differential (SD) FSR; in the
limit of large K, the reference becomes essentially noiseless, thereby eliminating
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the dominating “noise cross noise” term of reference-based systems and leading to
a system whose performance is only a fixed energy loss worse than the coherent
system whose implementation has proven so difficult [34]. Per above, the major
limitation of MD-FSR is a high peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR). The multiple
sinusoids with random data modulation essentially lead to a similar PAPR prob-
lem to that of orthogonal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM) systems.
The systems discussed above represent a small class of the possible waveforms
for separating the reference from the data which can be used for a reference-based
system. In a unified framework, performance analysis is done to obtain the po-
tential optimal set of waveforms as well as to help aid in comparison of the well
known systems. However, while considering this comparison, one thing that has
become apparent is that the constraints under which systems are compared must
be carefully considered. In particular, due to its noncoherent nature, reference
based systems can provide the somewhat unusual (and somewhat unpleasing)
feature of showing improved performance as data rate increases if performance
is plotted versus the average signal-to-noise (SNR) ratio [35, 36]. As described in
detail in [5], this is because the constraints for such a system must be carefully
considered. The peak power drawn from the transmitter pulse generator is of-
ten limited and corresponds to the cost in terms of battery life. Hence, we will
take peak pulse power as an important energy constraint. However, this is not
the only constraint, because the FCC provides a spectral mask below which the
power of the signal must lie. Once the transmitter pulse shape is set, compliance
with this spectral mask is measured over a short time period, hence inducing an
average power constraint. The choice of constraint has a significant impact on the
choice of the number frames per bit, which is a critical parameter when consider-
ing reference-based systems. Hints of this dependence can be seen in the differing
comparisons of [7], where FSR-UWB has shown to have optimality properties, for
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a large number of frames and [9], where CM-UWBwas shown to significantly out-
perform FSR-UWB for a small number of frames.
Per above, peak constraints are pertinent, and as described in [5], systems with
a higher peak-to-average power ratio (PAPR) will need a higher number of frames
and thus will need to be able to tolerate even more significant inter-frame interfer-
ence (IFI). But the inability to tolerate arbitrary IFI puts a limitation on the number
of frames. Therefore, strategies need to be considered to reduce the PAPR of many
systems. Here, we employ a tone reservation tactic similar to that from orthog-
onal frequency division multiplexing (OFDM), where additional peak reduction
carriers are used to alleviate the PAPR of the transmitted signal. But we hasten to
emphasize that, unlike OFDM, these additional waveforms come at no cost in data
rate. In particular, the constraint on the data rate for a multi-differential reference-
based system is that the frequency offset of each data carrier from the reference
must be less than the coherence frequency of the channel. But this constraint does
not apply to the additional tones added for peak reduction. We demonstrate that
the peak-reducing tones are still effective when placed at larger separations from
the reference than the data carrying tones, and thus do not cause any appreciable
loss in data rate.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 introduces
the systemmodel. Section 2.3 provides the development and performance analysis
for the unified framework. Section 2.4 introduces peak mitigation techniques and
Section 2.5 gives the numerical results for the reference-based systems considered.
Finally, Section 2.6 provides the conclusions.
2.2 SystemModel
Throughout this Chapter, a baseband UWB system will be assumed. Since
low data rate applications are targeted, a symbol interval Ts = Nf Tf consists of
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Nf ≫ 1 frames, each of duration Tf and containing a single UWB pulse p(t)
with normalized energy
∫
p2(t)dt = 1/Nf . Thus, for a given symbol interval, a
data-carrying signal is modulated onto the unit-energy train of impulses u(t) =
∑
Nf−1
k=0 p(t − kTf ). In a general reference-based framework with K data-carriers,
the transmitted signal consists of a reference signal and a collection of data signals,
modulating the impulse train; hence, over the lth symbol period, the transmitted
signal is given by:
x(t) = u(t− lTs)xenv(t− lTs)
where
xenv(t) =
(√
Er +
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
E
(k)
d φk(t)
)
(2.1)
Er and E
(k)
d , k = 0, 1, ...,K− 1, represent the energy in the reference and kth data-
bearing signal respectively, b(k)l is the k
th data bit in the lth symbol period, and
{φk(t), k = 0, 1, . . . ,K − 1} is an orthogonal set of waveforms with normaliza-
tion
∫ Ts
0 φ
2
k(t)dt = Ts for all k. Although it is not strictly necessary, we assume∫ Ts
0 φk(t)dt = 0 for all k, which is true of all of the major systems that have been
introduced. The natural receiver is then given in Fig. 2.1, where r˜(t) is the received
signal, r(t) is the low pass version of r˜(t), and r(k)l is the decision statistic that is
thresholded to make a decision on the kth bit sent during the lth symbol period.
The original FSR-UWB [5] transmitted signal over interval [lTs, (l + 1)Ts] is
given by:
x f sr(t) =
√
Eru(t− lTs) + (−1)b
(k)
l
√
2Ed cos(2π f0t)u(t − lTs) (2.2)
where
√
2 cos(2π f0t) represents the waveform separating the reference and data
waveforms, and f0 = 1/(2Ts) [28]. Note that FSR-UWB readily fits into the general
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r˜(t)
✲ LPF ✲
r(t)
(·)2
✲⊗
✻
φ0(t)
✲ ∫ (l+1)Ts
lTs
✲ r
(0)
l
≈ ......
✲⊗
✻
φK−1(t)
✲ ∫ (l+1)Ts
lTs
✲ r
(K−1)
l
Figure 2.1: Natural receiver structure of a K-dimensional class of reference-based
systems given in (2.1).
framework (2.1) with K = 1 and φ0(t) = cos(2π f0t). For multi-differential (MD-
FSR-UWB), [34] where multiple sinusoidal are used in parallel as data carrying
signals with a single reference, a critical constraint is that the frequency separation
between the reference signal and most distant data carrier must lie below the co-
herence frequency of the channel so that the reference sounds the proper channel
for all of the data carriers. This puts a constraint on the maximum combined data
rate of the MD-FSR-UWB system. The transmitted signal on [lTs, (l + 1)Ts], which
readily fits the form of (2.1), is given by:
xMD−FSR(t) =
√
Eru(t− lTs) +
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
2E
(k)
d cos(2π fkt)u(t − lTs) (2.3)
where K is the number of sinusoidal carriers, f0, f1, · · · , fK−1 are set by fk = (2k+
1) f0 to ensure that interference among carriers does not fall at one of the frequency
offsets of the data carriers from the reference.
Motivated by FSR-UWB, code shifted reference (CSR-UWB) [8] and code mul-
tiplexed (CM-UWB) [9] systems were developed. In CSR-UWB and CM-UWB,
the orthogonality of reference and data pulses is obtained from the rows of a
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Hadamard matrix. These codes yield square waves which form an orthogonal
set. The transmitted signal in the baseline case is:
xCSR/CM(t) =
Nf−1
∑
m=0
p(t−mTf ) + (−1)b0
Nf−1
∑
m=0
cmp(t−mTf ) (2.4)
where {cm : m = 0, 1, ...,Nf−1} represents a code sequence such that cm ∈ {−1,+1}
for all m and ∑
Nf−1
m=0 cm = 0. This system fits into (2.1) with K = 1 and separating
waveform:
φ0(t) = (−1)b0
Nf−1
∑
m=0
cmPTf (t−mTf ), (2.5)
where
PTf (t) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ 1, 0 ≤ t ≤ Tf0, otherwise. (2.6)
Clearly there are a large class of systems that fit into the reference based system
framework in (2.1), since there are an uncountable number of sets of separating
waveforms not yet considered. We unite the systems discussed thus far in addition
to the large class of systems into a unified framework of reference based systems
for joint analysis and design.
2.3 Performance Analysis
In this section, we consider the performance of an arbitrary system in the class.
2.3.1 Noiseless Case
First consider the output of the receiver of Fig. 2.1 in the noiseless case (i.e.,
r(t) = x(t)) for data bit b(k)0 , where the first symbol (i.e., l = 0) is considered
without loss of generality:
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r(k)0 =
∫ Ts
0
x2(t)φk(t)dt
=
∫ Ts
0
[
√
Eru(t) +
K−1
∑
m=0
(−1)b(m)0
√
E
(m)
d φm(t)u(t)]
2φk(t)dt
=
∫ Ts
0
u2(t)[Erφk(t) + 2
K−1
∑
m=0
(−1)b(m)0
√
ErE
(m)
d φm(t)φk(t)
+
K−1
∑
m=0
K−1
∑
n=0
(−1)b(m)0 (−1)b(n)0
√
E
(m)
d E
(n)
d φm(t)φn(t)φk(t)]dt (2.7)
≈ Er
Ts
∫ Ts
0
φk(t) +
2
√
ErE
(k)
d
Ts
(−1)b(m)0
∫ Ts
0
φ2k(t)dt (2.8)
Note that there will be many integrals of the form
∫ Ts
0 u
2(t)g(t)dt, where g(t)
is a narrowband signal. The result of this integral is approximately 1Ts
∫ Ts
0 g(t)dt
because the narrowband signal g(t) can be approximated constant over an inter-
val Tp and the number of frames is large [5]. Clearly, the second of the remaining
two terms in (2.7) is the desired term, and, in contrast to [7], we see that there
are significant constraints on the set φk(t), k = 0, 1, ...,K− 1 to make the third term
vanish. One way to state the constraint is that the product of any two separat-
ing waveforms in the set must have zero inner product with any other separating
waveform. As expected, the more specific version of this constraint has been ob-
tained in each of the MD-FSR case [34] and the CSR case [8]. With this constraint
on the separating waveforms,
r
(k)
0 ≈ 2
√
ErE
(k)
d (−1)b
(m)
0 (2.9)
As in [5], maximization of the useful receiver output in the noiseless case can be
used for energy allocation because the “noise cross noise” term dominate at error
rates of interest. From the convexity of the bit error rate on a given data carrier
K as a function of the energy E
(k)
d , it is clear that E
(0)
d = E
(1)
d = ... = E
(K−1)
d at
the optimal point. Hence we need to maximize ErE
(k)
d subject to KE
(k)
d + Er = Es.
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The maximum is achieved by setting Er = ∑
K−1
k=0 E
(k)
d =
Es
2 , and E
(k)
d =
Es
2K ; hence,
r(k)0 =
Es√
K
(−1)b(k)0 .
2.3.2 Performance in Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) Channels
The received signal is given by r˜(t) = x(t) + n˜(t), where n˜(t) is a zero-mean
Gaussian random process with (two-sided) power spectral density (PSD) of N0/2.
Assuming the lowpass filter at the receiver front end passes the transmitted signal
without distortion, its output signal is given by r(t) = x(t) + n(t), where n(t) is a
zero-mean Gaussian random process with PSD |H( f )|2N0/2 and H( f ) is the fre-
quency response of the lowpass filter. For the kth bit of symbol l = 0, the integrator
outputs are:
r
(k)
0 =
∫ Ts
0
r2(t)φk(t)dt
=
∫ Ts
0
[x(t) + n(t)]2φk(t)dt
≈ Es√
K
(−1)b(k)0 + 2
∫ Ts
0
x(t)n(t)φk(t)dt+
∫ Ts
0
n2(t)φk(t)dt (2.10)
The latter two terms, which will be denoted the “noise terms”, will be grouped
into a single random variable n0. Following the argument in [4, 5], we assume that
n0 is approximately Gaussian. Hence, only its mean and variance are required to
characterize system performance. The mean of n0 is given by:
E[n0] = 2
∫ Ts
0
E[x(t)]E[n(t)]φk(t)dt +
∫ Ts
0
E[n2(t)]φk(t)dt
=
√
2
∫ Ts
0
Rn(0)φk(t)dt
= 0 (2.11)
where Rn() denotes the autocorrelation function of n(t), and the variance of n0 is
given by:
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E[n20] = E[(2
∫ Ts
0
x(t)n(t)φk(t)dt +
∫ Ts
0
n2(t)φk(t))
2]
= E[(2
∫ Ts
0
x(t)n(t)φk(t)dt)
2 ] + E[(
∫ Ts
0
n2(t)φk(t))
2 ] (2.12)
= 2ErN0 +
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
E
(m)
d φ
2
m(t)φ
2
k (t)dt
+
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
K−1
∑
n ̸=m
(−1)b(m)0 (−1)b(n)0
√
E
(m)
d E
(n)
d φm(t)φn(t)φ
2
k(t)dt
+TsN
2
0W (2.13)
where the last line comes from a similar analysis done in [5]. For simplicity in
further sections we will refer to the “signal cross noise” term by SCN, defined
below, and derived in Appendix A.
SCN !
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
E
(m)
d φ
2
m(t)φ
2
k(t)dt
+
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
K−1
∑
m ̸=n
(−1)b(m)0 (−1)b(n)0
√
E
(m)
d E
(n)
d φm(t)φn(t)φ
2
k (t)dt (2.14)
Following the definition from above, the bit error probability in the general frame-
work is :
Pb = Q
⎛⎝ Es√K√
TsN20W + SCN
⎞⎠ = Q
⎛⎝ Eb√K√
TsN20W + SCN
⎞⎠ (2.15)
A similar error performance is observe at practical error rates across all systems
that employ the same K, since the “noise cross noise” term dominates at the (high)
uncoded error rates of interest. Comparisons are reserved for a later section.
2.3.3 Multipath Fading Channels
For a multipath fading channel, the received signal is:
r˜(t) = h(t) ∗ x(t) + n˜(t) (2.16)
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where h(t) is the system impulse response, which is assumed to consist of L dis-
crete paths, and thus can be represented as:
h(t) =
L−1
∑
l=0
hlδ(t− τl), (2.17)
where δ(·) is the Dirac delta function, and τl and hl are the delay and amplitude of
the lth path, respectively. Again, because the “noise cross noise” term dominates
at the (high) error rates of interest in uncoded systems [7], the key is the noiseless
decision statistic:
r
(k)
0 =
∫ Ts
0
(
L−1
∑
l=0
hlx(t− τl))2φk(t)dt
=
L−1
∑
l=0
L−1
∑
m=0
hlhm
∫ Ts
0
x(t− τl)x(t− τm)φk(t)dt
=
L−1
∑
l=0
L−1
∑
m=0
hlhm
∫ Ts
0
u(t− τl)u(t− τm)
(√
Es
2
+
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)0
√
Es
2K
φk(t− τl)
)
(√
Es
2
+
K−1
∑
n=0
(−1)b(n)0
√
Es
2K
φn(t− τm)
)
φk(t)dt
=
Es
2
√
K
L−1
∑
l=0
L−1
∑
m=0
hlhm
∫ Ts
0
(√
K+
1√
K
K−1
∑
k=0
K−1
∑
n=0
(−1)b(k)0 (−1)b(n)0
φk(t− τl)φn(t− τm) +
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)0 φk(t− τl) +
K−1
∑
n=0
(−1)b(n)0 φn(t− τm)
)
u(t− τl)u(t− τm)φk(t)dt
≈ (−1)b(k)0 Es√
K
L−1
∑
l=0
h2l
1
Ts
∫ Ts
0
φk(t− τl)φk(t)dt
+ (−1)b(k)0 Es
2
√
K
L−1
∑
l=0
∑
l ̸=m
hlhm
1
Ts
∫ Ts
0
(φk(t− τl) + φk(t− τm)) φk(t)dtρ(|τl − τm|)
(2.18)
where ρ(.) gives the normalized energy in the (often zero or partial) overlap of
UWB pulses of the separation of its argument; that is,
29
ρ ! Nf
∫ Tf
0
p(t− (τ mod Tf ))p(t)dt (2.19)
The motivation of the derivation above is to investigate what properties of φk(t)
will impact performance. Therefore, following [7], we define the autocorrelation
function of φk(t) as:
Rφk(τ) =
1
Ts
∫ Ts
0
φk(t)φk(t− τ)dt (2.20)
Substituting (2.20) into (2.18) yields:
r
(k)
0 = (−1)b
(k)
0
(
Es√
K
L−1
∑
l=0
h2l Rφk(τ) +
Es
2
√
K
L−1
∑
l=0
∑
l ̸=m
hlhmRφk(τl)Rφk (τm)ρ(|τl − τm|)
)
(2.21)
The first summand in (2.21) is generally positive for systems of interest, whereas
the second summand can often be negative due to the mismatch in the signs of the
path gains hl and hm. This suggests, maximizing the first summand, which would
indicate a large Rφk(τ) for τ ∈ [0, τmax] [7] corresponding to a broad autocorre-
lation function. But minimizing the second term would suggest a small Rφk(τ)
corresponding to a narrow autocorrelation function. This gives conflicting results
on the optimal settings for φk(t) to be considered later.
2.4 Peak Reduction via Tone Reservation
In the extensions of FSR-UWB and CM-UWB, and, for other systems with K >
1, a high PAPRmight be encountered. Therefore, to make reference-based systems
feasible in the multi-data case, techniques need to be investigated that can con-
tribute to reducing the overall PAPR of the system. The peak reduction solution
considered here is similar to the tone reservation technique used in OFDM [37]. In
this method, additional carriers are employed to carry signals that minimize the
overall peak of the transmitted signal. These carriers do not affect signal detection
at the receiver because they are orthogonal to the data carriers. The key insight
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here is that, since these peak reducers need not necessarily be interleaved with the
data carriers, they can be placed at frequency offsets greater than that of the data
carriers and above the coherence bandwidth of the system. In particular, recall that
data carriers need to be at frequency offsets below the coherence bandwidth so that
the reference properly sounds the channel. By placing the peak reduction tones at
higher frequency offsets, the data rate of the system is not affected, as shown in
Fig. 2.2. The transmit signal now becomes:
x(t) =
√
Eru(t− lTs) +
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
E
(k)
d u(t− lTs)φk(t− lTs)
+
P−1
∑
p=0
mpu(t− lTs)φK+p(t− lTs) (2.22)
where P is the number of peak reduction waveforms. Here, the amplitudes of
these extra waveforms, mp, p = 0, 1, ..., P− 1, are chosen optimally via a convex
optimization so that the peak power of the signal x(t) is minimized. In practice,
this optimization would be done off-line for each possible set of data bits and the
results stored in a table for efficient on-line usage.
In choosing the number of these carriers, P, there are a few issues to consider.
First, the average energy of the transmitted signal needs to be carefully observed,
since it gets larger by adding these carriers. Although the system must pay a total
average power penalty to accommodate the extra waveforms, a system that is IFI-
limited will not be able to increase Nf to deal with PAPR problems (see [5]), and
thus the reduction of the absolute peak allows more average energy to be put into
the data carriers. Secondly, Nf should be large enough to prevent the extra carriers
from effectively getting aliased to lower frequency tones.
A simple example is given in Fig. 2.3 for the envelope of the signal x(t) given
in (2.22). For a given P, optimal coefficients, mp’s, can be found to minimize the
peak value of the resulting signal. Clearly, the peak value decreases with increas-
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Figure 2.2: An example illustrating the difference of interleaving versus placing
peak reducing tones at the end for peak reduction
ing number of carriers and approaches to a limit, which is the value as P → ∞.
Knowing this limit reveals how close a given system is to the optimum achievable.
It is difficult to find this limit directly as it involves optimizing countably infinite
coefficients. Hence, we employ a dual space technique.
As in (2.1), let
xenv(t) =
√
Er +
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
E
(k)
d φk(t− lTs) +
P−1
∑
p=0
mpφK+p(t− lTs)
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Figure 2.3: Peak value of the envelope of an MD-FSR signal as a function of the
number of peak reduction carriers. For the example signal, K = 4, Er = 4, E
(k)
d =
1, b(k) = 1, ∀k. The original peak value is 2+ 4√2. The peak value of the signal
decreases with increasing P and approaches a limit.
be the envelope of the MD-FSR signal which modulates the pulse train. Let xref(t),
xdata(t) be the part of this signal that carries the reference and the data, respectively,
and m(t) = ∑∞p=0mpφK+p(t − lTs) be the signal added for peak reduction. With
these definitions,
xenv(t) = xref(t) + xdata(t) +m(t) (2.23)
is the signal which is required to have minimal peak value. Note that the peak
value of a signal is its infinity norm, denoted by ∥·∥∞ and notice that
∥xref(t) + xdata(t) +m(t)∥∞ = ∥xdata(t) +m(t)∥∞ +
√
Er. (2.24)
Then, the peak minimization problem can be equivalently posed as
minimize ∥xdata(t) +m(t)∥∞ . (2.25)
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The requirement here is that m(t) is a linear combination of functions in the set
{φk(t), k = K,K + 1, · · · }, which is a set of orthogonal functions. Thus, the mini-
mum peak value is
min
m(t)∈span{φk(t),k=K,K+1,··· }
∥xdata(t) +m(t)∥∞ +
√
Er. (2.26)
To find this value, we make use of the following theorem:
Theorem 1 ( [38, pg. 119] ) Let M be a subspace in a real normed space X. Let X∗ be the
dual space of X. Then,
min
m∈M⊥⊂X∗
∥x+m∥ = sup
y∈M⊂X, ∥y∥≤1
< y, x > . (2.27)
For y ∈ X and x ∈ X∗, < y, x > denotes the result of the functional when x acts
upon y. The vector that maximizes the value < y, x >, yopt, lies in the subspace
M, while the vector mopt lies in the space M⊥. M⊥ is defined as the set of vectors
which result in zerowhen applied on any vector inM. The peak reduction problem
in (2.26) is a problem in the space L∞. Thus, we find the minimum peak value by
solving the corresponding (easier) maximization problem in the space L1 which
has its dual L∞. In other words,
min
m(t)∈M⊥⊂L∞
∥xdata(t) +m(t)∥∞ = sup
y(t)∈M⊂L1, ∥y(t)∥1≤1
< y(t), xdata(t) > . (2.28)
Here, mopt(t) lies in the subspace M⊥ = span{φk(t), k = K,K + 1, · · · }. In MD-
FSR, φk(t) = cos(2π(2k+ 1) f0t), hence
M = span
{
{cos(2π(2k + 1) f0t), k = 0, 1, · · · ,K− 1} ∪ {sin(2πk f0t), k = 1, 2 · · · }
∪{cos(2π(2k) f0t), k = 0, 1, 2 · · · }
}
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Within this subspaceM, finding yopt(t) is not easier than findingmopt(t). However,
we narrow down the subspace M by the following observations:
1. Projection of yopt(t) onto span{sin(2πk f0t), k = 1, 2 · · · } is the zero signal,
because < sin(2πk f0t), xdata(t) >= 0, ∀k, and adding a sine function to y(t)
only increases the 1-norm.
2. Projection of yopt(t) onto span{cos(2π(2k) f0t), k = 0, 1, 2 · · · }} is the zero
signal, because < cos(2π(2k) f0t), xdata(t) >= 0, ∀k, and adding an even fre-
quency cosine function to y(t) only increases the 1-norm.
Hence, the subspace that yopt(t) lies is confined to span{cos(2π(2k+ 1) f0t), k =
0, · · · ,K− 1}. Thus y(t) = ∑K−1k=0 yk cos(2π(2k + 1) f0t), where yk’s are real scalars
to be optimized. Then,
< y(t), xdata(t) >=
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
E
(k)
d yk, (2.29)
which results in the following optimization problem:
maximize
K−1
∑
k=0
(−1)b(k)l
√
E
(k)
d yk (2.30)
subject to
∫ Ts
0
∣∣∣∣ K−1∑
k=0
yk cos(2π(2k+ 1) f0t)
∣∣∣∣dt ≤ 1. (2.31)
This K-parameter maximization problem (e.g., K = 4 in Fig. 2.3) is clearly easier
to solve than the norm minimization problem with countably infinite parameters
in the dual space. The result of this maximization problem plus
√
Er is equal to the
minimum peak value that can be achieved. Numerical results are given in the next
Section.
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2.5 Numerical Results
Per above, the constraints under which the system comparison is made are crit-
ical, as can be evidenced by the conflicting results of [7] and [9]. Here we consider
both peak and average power constraints.
For all the results presented, the pulse shape is the second derivative Gaussian
with a zero-to-zero pulse width of .25 ns. The noise bandwidth, corresponding to
that of a front end filter, is 4.0 GHz (one-sided). Simulation results were conducted
over multipath channels from the IEEE 802.15.4a standardization [2]. The two
channels considered were IEEE 802.15.4a indoor line-of-sight (LOS) model (CM3)
and IEEE 802.15.4a indoor non-light-of-sight (NLOS) model (CM4).
2.5.1 Average Power Constraint (Small Nf Case)
With solely an average power constraint, system performance is optimized
([35, 36]) by employing a small number of frames (Nf ) per symbol. In [9] sig-
nificant performance differences have been observed between CSR/CM-UWB and
FSR-UWB for small Nf which, for a fixed frame period, corresponds to large data
rates. Here we probe this comparison further. When IFI is not considered, FSR
suffers degradation because its modulating xenv(t) is not constant over a frame pe-
riod. Therefore one possible solution would be to sample the envelope at the be-
ginning of each frame and hold that sample across the frame period, hencemaking
it constant over the frame period. This sample-hold approach will be called “mod-
ified FSR-UWB” (M-FSR-UWB). Furthermore, as investigated in detail in [5], the
frequency offset causes a performance degradation as the data rate approaches the
coherence frequency of the channel. In [28], it is noted that the frequency offset
of FSR-UWB can be halved to address this latter concern. This alternative to the
original FSR-UWB is “FSR-2-UWB” where instead of the frequency offset f0 =
1
Ts
,
an offset of f0 =
1
2Ts
is used to enhance system performance.
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In Figs. 2.4, 2.5 performance is considered under an average power constraint,
which corresponds to small Nf , as described above. For the high data rate of 7.8
Mbps (Nf = 8) FSR-UWB has poor performance compared to the other systems
considered. M-FSR-UWB shows improved performance compared to FSR, FSR-2-
UWB shows slightly better performance compared to CSR-UWB.
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Figure 2.4: Simulated results for the performance of various binary schemes on the
IEEE 802.15.4a indoor LOS model (CM3) with a fixed frame time of Tf = 16 ns, Nf
= 8 (dashed curves) and Nf = 16 (solid curves) which correspond to Rb = 7.8 Mbps
and 3.9 Mbps, respectively. For each point, 106 data symbols have been simulated.
2.5.2 Peak Power Constraint (Large Nf Case)
CMOS technology trends shows that there will be peak-power limitations in
low-power-integrated circuitry for an ultra-wideband transmitter, as described in
[10]. For devices to meet the circuit constraints, FCC spectral mask, and maximize
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Figure 2.5: Simulated results for the performance of various binary schemes on
the IEEE 802.15.4a indoor NLOS model (CM4) with a fixed frame time of Tf = 16
ns, Nf = 8 (dashed curves) and Nf = 16 (solid curves) which correspond to Rb =
7.8 Mbps and 3.9 Mbps, respectively. For each point, 106 data symbols have been
simulated.
system performance from a commercialization perspective under a peak power
constraint would suggest large Nf (on the order of approximately 75 pulses, in
[10]). This is further exacerbated in systems with significant PAPR, because they
must further increase Nf to boost average power [5].
For large Nf , our analysis and [7] suggest a broad autocorrelation function
Rφk(τ) of the separating waveform would correspond with improved system per-
formance. In the case of binary CM-UWB, as considered in [9], the optimal sepa-
rating waveform would be
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φ(t) =
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
1 0 ≤ t ≤ 12
−1 12 < t ≤ 1
0 otherwise
(2.32)
which corresponds to the burst-mode PPM, and is arrived at through a different
derivation in [9].
In Figs. 2.6, 2.7 we consider performance under a peak power constraint which
corresponds to a large Nf . We see that systems underneath this constraint again
have similar performance, and thus for the binary case, conclude that ease of im-
plementation is the key differentiator. This points to CM/CSR-UWB approaches,
which avoid not only the delay lines of TR-UWB but also the amplitude modula-
tion of FSR-UWB.
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Figure 2.6: Simulated results for the performance of various binary schemes on the
IEEE 802.15.4a indoor LOS model (CM3) with a fixed frame time of Tf = 15.5 ns,
Nf = 64 which correspond to Rb = 1 Mbps. For each point, 10
6 data symbols have
been simulated.
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Figure 2.7: Simulated results for the performance of various binary schemes on the
IEEE 802.15.4a indoor NLOS model (CM4) with a fixed frame time of Tf = 15.625
ns, Nf = 64 which correspond to Rb = 1 Mbps, respectively. For each point, 10
6
data symbols have been simulated.
2.5.3 Peak Reduction via Tone Reservation
Per above, performance can be greatly improved versus the binary systems
by employing more data carriers; however, PAPR problems must be addressed.
One approach is peak reduction via tone reservation (Section 2.4) where the PAPR
value of the transmitted signal is reduced with no change in the receiver system
and without compromising in bit error rate performance. In Fig. 2.8 the simulated
bit error rate performance of an MD-FSR system with and without peak reduc-
tion is compared. As expected, for all three channels simulated, bit error rates
remain the same under both cases for all SNR values. This supports the claim
that adding orthogonal carriers to the transmitted signal does not affect the detec-
tion performance. Next, how the number of peak reduction carriers, P, affects the
amount of peak reduction is considered. Of course, P can be increased to achieve
smaller peaks and this increase will have no effect on the bit error rate perfor-
mance. However, the increased number of carriers give diminishing gains and
40
initial peak (max|xenv(t)|) initial and final energy peak reduction (dB) final peak
FSR, K = 4 0.8263 1, 1.7487 2.9270 0.5899
CSR/CM, K = 4 0.6475 1, 1 0 0.6475
FSR, K = 2 0.6475 1, 1.3185 2.1436 0.5059
CSR/CM, K = 2 0.5211 1, 1 0 0.5211
FSR, K = 1 0.5211 1, 1.0978 1.1605 0.4559
CSR/CM, K = 1 0.4317 1, 1 0 0.4317
Table 2.1: Peak reduction results for CSR/CM-UWB and FSR-UWB schemes (Nf =
128, Tf = 31.25 ns, and P = 20)
there is a nonzero limit to how much the peak can be reduced, as considered in
Section 2.4. The change of peak reduction as a function of the number of extra
carriers is shown in Fig. 2.9. In this example, peak reducing carriers are placed at
higher frequencies than the data carriers. We further explore how peak minimiza-
tion is improved when the frequencies of the data and peak reduction carriers are
selected optimally (possibly by interleaving their frequency locations). In Fig. 2.9,
it can be seen that relocating the frequencies does not return much in terms of
peak reduction. So we conclude that peak reduction is not significantly below op-
timal when the peak reduction carriers are placed at higher frequency offsets than
the data carriers. It might also seem possible to add extra carriers to a CSR/CM-
UWB signal for peak reduction. However, while a CSR/CM-UWB signal has a
lower initial peak compared to FSR-UWB, the specific separating waveforms used
in CSR/CM-UWB do not allow peak reduction by adding extra carriers. Table 2.1
presents the peak values before and after peak reduction for CSR/CM-UWB and
FSR-UWB for the case of K = 1, 2, 4 carriers and P = 20 peak reducers.
2.6 Conclusion
We have considered the comparison of recently proposed reference-based sys-
tems under both peak and average constraints. Including all of these systems into
a single framework allows for a unified performance analysis and suggests op-
timality properties to guide system design. For reference-based systems with a
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Figure 2.8: BER computed for an MD-FSR system with 5 data carriers for different
SNR values. Three different channels are simulated for cases (1) without peak
reduction and (2) with peak reduction by adding 3 extra carriers. As expected, for
all the three channels simulated, bit error rates remain the same under both cases
for all SNR values. This justifies the fact that adding orthogonal carriers to the
transmitted signal do not affect the detection performance.
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Figure 2.9: Peak Reduction of Multi-Differential FSR-UWB with additional tones
(K=5), while either interleaved in blue with triangle markers or at the end in red
with circle markers.
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single data carrier, halving the frequency offset between reference and data in the
frequency-shifted reference UWB system, as suggested in recent work, leads to
slight performance advantages over alternatives under peak and average power
constraints. However, since the gains are slight, this suggest code-multiplexed
or code-shifted reference UWB systems for implementation, since they avoid the
amplitude modulation required in the frequency-shifted reference UWB system.
In the binary case, the optimal code-multiplexed and code-shifted reference UWB
systems reduce to burst-mode pulse-position modulation, which is akin to what
has been employed in the 802.15.4a standard.
Systems that employ multiple data carriers with a single reference have the
potential to greatly improve performance versus their single data carrier counter-
parts; however, all considered systems then require amplitude modulation, and
can suffer from a significant PAPR, which limits performance under peak power
constraints. Here, we have introduced peak mitigation alternatives that do not re-
strict the data rate and are effective for some systems in the class, most notably
for the multiple data carrier version of frequency-shifted reference UWB. Such
peak mitigation techniques lead to small PAPR gains of frequency-shifted refer-
ence UWB versus code-multiplexed and code-shifted reference UWB systems.
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Figure 2.10: Performance of various binary schemes on the IEEE 802.15.4a indoor
NLOS model (CM4) with a fixed frame time of Tf = 15.5 ns, Nf = 64 (Rb = 1Mbps).
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Figure 2.11: Average power of the MD-FSR signal as a function of the number of
peak reduction carriers, P. As P increases, the peak value of the signal goes down
(see Fig. 2.3) and the average power increases.
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Figure 2.12: Peak to average power (PAPR) of the MD-FSR signal as a function of
the number of peak reduction carriers, P. As P increases, the peak value of the
signal goes down (see Fig. 2.3) while the average power increases (see Fig. 2.11),
hence PAPR value decreases.
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CHAPTER 3
WIRELESS SECURITY: SECRECY RATE PAIR CONSTRAINTS
FOR SECURE THROUGHPUT
Physical layer security, which is an alternative to traditional crytpographic meth-
ods, has emerged as a promising candidate to protect wireless transmissions from
an eavesdropper. An important measure of physical layer security is the secrecy
outage: the event when the instantaneous secrecy capacity, which for the consid-
ered scenario is the difference between the capacity of the Alice (the transmitter)
to Bob (the legitimate receiver) channel and the capacity of the Alice to Eve (the
eavesdropper) channel, is below a target secrecy rate for which the system has been
designed. In this Chapter, we argue that design under such an outage definition on
a wireless channel is inadequate in some scenarios, as it treats very different error
events with equal weight. In response, we propose that two conditions aremet: the
instantaneous capacity between the source and destination is above a target rate
and the instantaneous capacity between the source and eavesdropper is held be-
low a target rate. The two individual target rates form a secrecy rate pair. This also
naturally splits the outage event into two regions with quite different costs: the
eavesdropper’s ability to decode the message (which is a security breach andmust
be avoided), and the destination’s inability to decode the message (which simply
requires a re-transmission). We use our formulation to consider rate pair selection
in hybrid ARQ systems and provide numerical results supporting this approach.
At the end of the Chapter we extend these results to the two-hop network, where
optimization is done numerically.
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3.1 Background
Many organizations and companies are focusing significant energy and resources
on security because of the negative consequences of an insecure network (e.g. iden-
tity theft, secret intel). In the next sections we will give background on crypto-
graphic security and then focus on information-theoretic security for the remain-
der of the dissertation.
3.1.1 Cryptographic Security
Cryptography has been a standard way to secure wireless (or any) communi-
cations: modify the transmitted signal in such a way that a user with the cryp-
tographic key can easily decode the signal, whereas a user without the key is
thwarted by their inability to solve a “hard” problem with current computational
resources. The technique of using a shared secret key is known as symmetric en-
cryption. Symmetric encryption relies heavily on the ability to establish a shared
secret key, which can be very difficult to do in large networks. A weakness of this
system is that it is susceptible to a key possibly falling into the hands of the eaves-
dropper. In contrast asymmetrical encryption employs a public key encryption
system. Asymmetrical encryption systems allow users to establish security over a
public channel without both users sharing the same private key. A commonly use
example of asymmetric encryption in cryptography is shown in Fig. 3.1, the widely
used DiffieHellman key exchange protocol [21], where the source and destination
establish a key over an insecure channel. The eavesdropper is at a significant com-
putational disadvantage to decode the message because he/she does not know
the secret integers chosen by the source and destination. For example consider this
simplistic example of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol:
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1. Alice and Bob agree on two prime numbers p, g, where g is a primitive root
modulo p. In practice this is 512 bits but for simplicity we will consider the
case when p = 7, g = 3.
2. Alice and Bob choose secretly known random integers a and b respectively,
privately known to them only. Alice sends A = ga mod p and Bob sends
B = gb mod p. For the case of Alice and Bob choosing a = 8, b = 15 results
in A = 2, B = 6.
3. Alice and Bob compute their shared secret key S, which is equal to Ba mod p =
1, Ab mod p = 1.
In this cryptosystem Alice and Bob now share the secret key S (in the above ex-
ample S = 1), while p, g, ga mod p, gb mod p are public. The Diffie-Hellman
algorithm highlights a strong assumption typically seen in cryptography: limited
computational abilities of the eavesdropper.
There have been many cryptogrphaic techniques which have become obsolete
and ineffective at security because of flaws seen later on. Awidely known example
is 802.11b wired equivalent privacy (WEP) encryption that was shown insecure
[39] because the length of the key is 24 bits, which meant a key was reused every
16 million frames, making it very vulnerable to a brute force attack in a quick time
interval. Another problem with WEP was that it lacked true randomness and thus
keys were closely related. Lastly, a hardware issue was that an important part of
the Initial Vector (IV) frame, always reset to 0 on power cycle.
Currently, the field of quantum computing is a primary candidate to challenge
current computational resource assumptions. Projects such as “Penetrating Hard
Targets” and “Owning the Net” are projects invested into quantum research, at-
tempting to decrypt some of the most widely used encryption algorithms such as
Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard Adleman (RSA) [40] . RSA was first pub-
48
Alice Bob
Alice sends A to Bob
Bob sends B to Alice
Random 
integer a
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 p, g, chosen
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Figure 3.1: Simplified flow diagram of the Diffie-Hellman public key exchange
protocol. The green shaded boxes represent information that is privately known
to Alice or Bob (secret key S, integers a, b). The red shaded rectangular boxes rep-
resent public information (p, g, A, B).
lished in 1977, a public-key asymmetrical cryptosystem where the encoding key
is public and the decryption key is private. The complexity and hardness of RSA
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comes from the difficulty in factoring the product of two large prime numbers
(prime factorization problem).
In general three central drawbacks of cryptography can be summarized as:
Assume limited computational resources of an eavesdropper, which can be challenged
as new forms of computation is considered. First, there exist no unbreakable cryp-
tographic encryption schemes. In early 2009 it was shown using a group
of classical computers and methods that a 768 bit key could be cracked (al-
though it took over 2 years to accomplish). Most companies use a 1024-bit
encryption key, which is estimated to take over 100 times longer to crack.
However, quantum research advances could be the downfall of traditional
cryptographic techniques.
They are based on the assumption of hardness of the underlying primitives which
has not been proven. When information-theoretic security cannot be achieved,
cryptographers seek an alternative using computational security. Cryptog-
raphers assume adversaries are computationally limited, but the hardness of
a problem is difficult to prove. Problems which suggest hardness include
integer factorization, where for large numbers no efficient factorization algo-
rithm is known as in the widely used RSA algorithm, and the discrete loga-
rithm problem, solving the equation bk = g for k, where no efficient algorith-
mic solution is known (e.g. Diffie-Hellman key exchange). Computational
security proofs are not valid though, only if these problems that are believed
to be hard are indeed so (P ̸= NP); in other words, they cannot be solved in
polynomial time.
The message can be stored by an eavesdropper for later decoding after obtaining the
key, hence breaking the cryptographic system. Very important is that this trans-
lates to not having everlasting security, although many forms of information
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are to sensitive forever or for a long time. For example inWorldWar II, in the
Venona project [41] (1941-1946), the Soviet Union used two-time pads (which
will be discussed in more detail in the following section), which were inse-
cure since message bits were leaked to the U.S.A. and Britain. The Allies were
able to leverage this flaw to decode some of the messages.
3.1.2 Wireless Environment
Thus far we have discussed cryptographic (computational) security which in
summary relies on the limited computational abilities of an eavesdropper to solve
a “hard problem” given current computational resources. But computational se-
curity does not need to take advantage of the natural disruptions ubiquitous in
the physical (wireless) environment. In particular the wireless environment expe-
riences especially path loss and fading. Path loss is the degradation of the signal
amplitude with distance as it travels through the medium, and fading is multi-
ple copies of the signal traveling a different path experiencing attenuation, phase
shift and delay. As a result if the signal has to travel a long distance, one can
expect detection to be more difficult than a signal that travels a shorter distance.
Information-theoretic physical layer security, which will be formally introduced
in the next section, takes full advantage of the noisy wireless environment and
does not rely on computational assumptions on the eavesdropper, thus providing
everlasting security immune from cryptanalyst techniques. Information-theoretic
security cannot be obtained when there is no advantage to exploit in the wireless
environment, e.g. the eavesdropper is very close to the source. In contrast because
cryptography ignores the wireless environment, it is unaffected by the position of
an eavesdropper.
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3.1.3 Information-theoretic Security
In contrast to cryptography, information-theoretic physical layer security has
recently emerged as a method to secure wireless links irrespective of the current
or future computational capabilities of the eavesdropper. In short, the signal the
eavesdropper observes does not contain enough information to identify the trans-
mitted message. Moreover this assumption is different than cryptography, where
message contents are widely available though in an encrypted form. Information-
theoretic security was pioneered by Claude Shannon in his seminal work in [22].
Information-theoretic security does not rely on a key but an advantage on the chan-
nel, guarantees everlasting security: no contents of the message are leaked to Eve
and the message is secure forever.
Shannon first considered physical layer security for a noiseless wireline chan-
nel. Shannon modeled the following scenario (Fig. 3.2): Alice (source) desires to
communicate secretly to Bob (destination) in the presence of Eve (eavesdropper),
and Alice has a secure link with Bob where they share K information bits, also
known as the key. Shannon, mathematically, defined the notion of information-
theoretic secure as the mutual information between the message M and the encod-
ing function X(gK(M)) as nil:
I(M;X) = H(M)− H(M|X) (3.1)
where I(M;X) is the measure of uncertainty between the message and the en-
coding function, H(M) is the measure of unpredictability in the message M and
H(M|X) represents the measure of uncertainty of the message M, given you know
the encoding function X. If the above (3.1) is non-zero, then contents of the mes-
sage are leaked to Eve. Shannon then proceeded to answer the following questions:
1. How long must K be for an N-bit message M?
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Alice
Bob
Codeword
M
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Figure 3.2: Wireline channel: Alice establishes a private secure link (green dashed
line) with Bob so that they can establish a private shared key. Alice encodes the
message with the private key to form a codeword to communicate to Bob. Eve
is able to listen perfectly to the codeword, where gK(M) represents the encoding
function, and M is the message. The goal is to ensure the eavesdropper is com-
pletely uncertain of the message (?) while the destination can reliably decode the
message (M).
2. How do you choose gK(M)?
For the first question he noted that, to guarantee secrecy, the key had to be as
long as the message, and, for the latter question, concluded the encoding function
to be the onetime pad [22]. As shown in Fig. 3.3, Bob is able to easily decode the
message because of knowledge of the pre-shared key, whereas Eve receives a code-
word which has little to no use without information about the key. We have con-
sidered unique keys, for each individual messages, but can we reuse keys which
could lead to a more practical and efficient design? Consider the extension of the
one-time pad to a two-time pad (Fig. 3.4). Unfortunately in this scenario, Eve
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can derive (M1 ⊕ K1)⊕ (M2 ⊕ K1) = M1 ⊕ M2. Although Eve does not directly
have M1 or M2 exclusively, K information bits have been leaked; in this case, the
scheme is not information-theoretic secure. This classic example was exploited in
the Venona project during WW2. The U.S.A. was able to crack some of the So-
viet Union’s messages because of broken one-time pads that reuse keys (two-time
pads), in which case the U.S.A was able to decode 20% of the coded messages [41].
One-Time 
Pad
MKKM =⊕⊕ )(
Eve
Alice
Bob
Codeword
M
KM ⊕
M
?
Figure 3.3: The one-time pad, which guarantees everlasting security, is shown.
Alice takes each message (M) and xor’s with a one-time key, because Alice-to-Bob
has a secure link where they can establish a shared key about which Eve has no
information. Perfect security is met and Alice can communicate securely to Bob.
3.2 Wiretap Channel
Following Shannon’s work, Wyner considered secrecy over a noisy channel,
the wiretap channel, where the signal observed at the eavesdropper is a degraded
version of the signal observed at the legitimate receiver [13]. For this degraded
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Bob
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KM ⊕2
KM ⊕1
21,MM
21 MM ⊕
21,MM
Figure 3.4: The two-time pad is an extension to the one-time pad, where instead
the key is reused for multiple messages. This is insecure and dangerous because
e.g. English has enough redundancy and ASCII encoding where the individualM1
and M2 can be easily extracted.
scenario, Wyner came to the conclusion that a non-zero information rate can be
maintained by the transmitter and receiver while the eavesdropper gets no infor-
mation about the message. Of interest for our work is the extension of this result
to the Gaussian channel [42]. Further work has demonstrated that, under quite
general conditions, the secrecy capacity is given by the difference in the capacities
between the main channel and the eavesdropper channel [11, 23, 24].
3.2.1 Wiretap Construction
Wyner first noted the signal observed at the eavesdropper is a degraded version
of the signal observed at the legitimate receiver; the wiretap channel [13]. Later,
it was proven for the Gaussian channel that a non-zero information rate can be
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maintained if the Alice to Eve channel is worse than the Alice to Bob channel [42]:
R = log2(1+ SNRAB)− log2(1+ SNRAE) (3.2)
The main result is that for the wiretap channel, a positive secrecy rate can be
achieved as long as the instantaneous secrecy rate is above the target secrecy rate.
In practice and mathematical terms all Gaussian channels are degraded versions
of each other; thus, Fig. 3.5 represents the mathematical model. Next, and perhaps
most important are the construction of codes for the wiretap channel, which rely
on answers to the following key questions:
Eve
Alice Bob
Main Channel 
Eavesdropper 
Channel
Figure 3.5: The wiretap channel is shown. Alice desires to communicate to Bob
through the main channel. The eavesdropper listens to the message but through
the degraded eavesdropper channel.
1. What is the maximum rate at which the Alice can communicate to Bob (main
channel, RAB) ?
2. What is the maximum rate in which Eve can listen to Alice (eavesdropper
channel, RAE) ?
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As a result of this information, and dictated by the channel conditions, a target
secrecy capacity can be calculated from the difference of the rates of the main and
eavesdropper channel. Next, the code book construction is considered:
1. The source (Alice) generates 2NRAB random codewords.
2. Alice splits these codewords randomly into 2NRAE bins.
3. The codebook is broadcast to everyone.
This code construction maps R0 = RAB − RAE information bits to the appropriate
bin. For simplicity, Fig. 3.6 depicts the wiretap code construction case when N = 1
(in practice N would be very large), RAB = 4, RAE = 2; therefore, R0 = 2. In
this example Alice first generates 16 random codewords; second, randomly splits
these 16 codewords into 4 bins; and, last, broadcasts the codebook to everyone.
For example, consider the case where Alice desires to send the information bits 11
to Bob. Alice would randomly select a bin and use the information bits as the least
significant bits to identify a codeword in that bin as shown in Fig. 3.7. Bob is able to
successfully decode the exact codeword, and the bin yields the message due to the
fact Bob can receive at 4 bits, and accurately distinguish between the 16 codewords
as seen in Fig. 3.8a. In contrast Eve is unable to decode the message because Eve
receives at 2 bits; therefore Eve can only accurately produce a list of 4 possible
codewords, which will produce 4 codewords which are randomly spread across
the bin, as illustrated in Fig. 3.8b. Note that in a practical system where N is large
the ambiguity at Eve is larger. We will show later that this natural interpretation
of the wiretap code yields a different formulation than the standard formulation,
which will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
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Figure 3.6: A cartoon (N = 1) example of the wiretap construction is shown for an
instantaneous rate to Bob and Eve at 4 and 2 bits, respectively, that yields a secrecy
rate of 2 bits. The 16 (2RAB) codewords and 4 (2RAE) bins represent the rate to Bob
and Eve, respectively.
3.3 Secrecy Rate Pair Formulation
Onwireless communication channels, the randomness of the fading gainsmakes
it impossible to guarantee secrecy over every instantiation of the fading, hencemo-
tivating the concept of secrecy outage. The instantaneous capacity is defined as the
maximum rate of information that can be reliably transmitted between Alice and
Bob conditioned on the fading, noted as RB; likewise, between Alice and Eve, RE.
The secrecy outage is generally defined as the probability the instantaneous se-
crecy capacity (RS = RB − RE), the difference between the instantaneous capacity
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Send to 
Bob 
(0011)
Figure 3.7: Alice desires to send bits 11 to Bob and randomly chooses bin 00 to
send the message. The codeword sent is 0011 with the public bits 00.
of the Alice and Bob (RB) channel and that of the Alice and Eve (RE) channel, is less
than the targeted secrecy rate (R0) [11, 12]. Hence for a secure system, secrecy is
achieved when the secrecy rate (RS) is above the designed secrecy rate (RS ≥ R0).
Figure 3.9 shows the secrecy region as a function of RE and RB when R0 = 2.
The target secrecy rate is R0 = 2, and the entire shaded region represents RS =
RB − RE ≥ 2, where channel conditions are favorable and the secrecy capacity is
above the targeted secrecy rate. However, because “universal” wiretap codes are
unknown, we maintain that it can be difficult to guarantee secrecy over the entire
region where RS = RB − RE ≥ 2. For example, consider a wiretap code designed
for the rate pair, RB = 4, RE = 2 which we will denote as RS(4, 2). Consider
channel conditions which maintain the secrecy rate constraint (RS ≥ 2) but where
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(a) Bob receives at a rate of 4 bits, determines
that the codeword is 0011 and extracts the in-
fomation bits 11.
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(b) Eve receives at a rate of 2 bits, determines
the publicly known bits 00 but uncertain of
the information bits because needs to receive
at 4 bits.
Figure 3.8: Decoding at Bob and Eve respectively for (4, 2)wiretap code. Therefore
the system is secure for a rate of 2 bits.
the instantaneous capacity at the eavesdropper and destination are RS(3, 1), or
RS(5, 3) as a result of varying channel conditions. In the standard formulation,
these distinct channel conditions are treated quite equally and the system is secure
since the secrecy outage constraint RS ≥ 2 is satisfied.
In this Chapter we offer a tighter definition of secrecy outage and form a differ-
ent secrecy outage formulation, where we consider not only choosing a target se-
crecy rate that represents the difference between the main channel and eavesdrop-
per channel, but rather the choice of two individual target secrecy rates. Hence,
rather than one degree of freedom, R0, as in the outage formulation shown in, for
example, [11], we introduce two degrees of freedom (RB0, RE0) for a system not to
be an outage; in other words, Bob must be able to decode the message while Eve
is unable to decode the message. This translates to the notion of a tighter secrecy
region than [11], shown in the rectangular shaded region in Fig 3.9. For example if
a RS(4, 2) wiretap code is employed, instantaneous channel conditions leading to
the occurrence of RS(3, 1) or RS(5, 3) would be deemed an outage in our secrecy
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Figure 3.9: Secrecy region for R0 = 2, where the lighter shaded rectangular (green)
region shows the secrecy region for a system design for the wiretap code (RB0 =
4, RE0 = 2). The darker shaded triangular (red) regions show the areas of outage
not considered in the standard formulation, where the upper triangle represents
the eavesdropper rate being too high (RE > 2) as the cause of an outage and the
lower triangle represents where the destination rate being too low (RB < 4) is the
cause of an outage.
rate pair formulation because, in the former case, RB < RB0, and in the latter case,
RE > RE0.
The secrecy outage definition of [11] is sufficient if RB or RE is known (i.e. chan-
nel state information (CSI) ), in which case the choice of R0 fixes the other rate (RE0
or RB0, respectively) and hence specifies the pair, in which case our definition is
equivalent to the standard definition. However, if neither RB nor RE is known (i.e
no channel state information at the transmitter [11, pg 199]), then we would argue
that our stricter definition is required. This will be demonstrated concretely in the
Secrecy Rate Pair Formulation (Section 3.4).
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The two different outage regions RB < RB0 and RE > RE0 also come with a
quite different costs, as interception of the message is more important than simply
the dropping of the packet (in which retransmission can be employed). In par-
ticular, we can exploit the use of automatic repeat request (ARQ) schemes [14],
keeping the eavesdropper intercept probability below the outage constraint while
maximizing throughput to the destination which will be explained in Section 3.4.
In Section 3.4 we will explore two widely used hybrid ARQ systems: basic hybrid
ARQ, where there is no memory and the receiver only provides the source with
a single bit of feedback telling whether the packet was received correctly, and hy-
brid ARQwith soft combining, where the receiver also buffers receptions and uses
packet combining over multiple transmissions to increase the SNR of the received
message.
3.3.1 System Model
In this section we discuss the system model used throughout this Chapter
and then consider secrecy outage under the standard and proposed rate pair ap-
proaches. We consider a wireless network where a source node A (Alice) wishes
to communicate to a destination node B (Bob) in the presence of a passive eaves-
dropper node E (Eve).
Each transmitted symbol of the source node A is denoted by x
(A)
i , and each
received symbol for the destination node B and eavesdropper E will be denoted
by y
(B)
i , and y
(E)
i respectively. We assume frequency non-selective Rayleigh fading
between the active transmitter and each of the receivers, where hX,Y is the nor-
malized (E[|hX,Y |2] = 1) multipath fading on a link from a given transmitter X to
a given receiver Y and is a complex zero-mean Gaussian random variable. The
multipath fading is assumed to be constant over the duration of a codeword and
independent for each distinct transmitter-receiver pair. The received signal at the
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destination and eavesdropper are, respectively:
y
(B)
i =
hA,B√
dαA,B
√
Esx
(A)
i + n
(B)
i
y
(E)
i =
hA,E√
dαA,E
√
Esx
(A)
i + n
(E)
i (3.3)
where dX,Y is the distance between nodes X andY, α is the path-loss exponent, Es is
the transmitted energy per symbol, {n(B)i } and {n(E)i } are independent sequences
of independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) zero-mean complex Gaussian
random variables with variance N0, and |hX,Y|2 is an exponentially distributed
random variable with parameter 1. The locations of the system nodes are assumed
to be known, including that of the eavesdropper. However the channel gains hA,E
and hA,B are assumed to be unknown at the transmitter (i.e. no transmitter channel
state information). When multiple packets are considered in the ARQ systems, it
will be assumed that the fading affecting different packets is independent.
3.3.2 Standard Secrecy Rate Constraint
Since we consider a fading environment with additive white Gaussian noise, a
Gaussian wiretap model is used, where the instantaneous secrecy rate conditioned
on the fading is [42]:
RS = log2(1+ γAB)− log2(1+ γAE) (3.4)
where γAB !
|hA,B|2Es
N0dαA,B
, and γAE !
|hA,E|2Es
N0dαA,E
. As defined in [11, 12], the secrecy outage
is defined as the probability that the fading values hA,B, and hA,E are such that RS
is below a targeted secrecy rate R0, which yields:
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Pout = P(RS < R0)
= P(log2(1+ γAB)− log2(1+ γAE) < R0)
= P
⎛⎜⎝1+ |hA,B|
2Es
N0dαA,B
1+ |hA,E|
2Es
N0dαA,E
< 2R0
⎞⎟⎠ = 1− e−2
R0N0d
α
A,B+N0d
α
A,B
Es
1+
2R0dαA,B
dαA,E
(3.5)
For example, consider the case where the target secrecy rate is R0 = 2. Secrecy is
achieved when RS ≥ 2, and outage occurs if RS < 2. In Fig. 3.9, the secrecy event
for R0 = 2 is shown. The unshaded region represents the area where the system
is in outage (RS < R0), and the total shaded region represents where the system is
secure (RS ≥ R0).
3.3.3 Secrecy Rate Pair Constraint
Motivated by the inability to guarantee secrecy for all RS > R0 when trans-
mitter CSI is unavailable, as described in Section 3.1, we thus consider a tighter
definition for secrecy outage. In our formulation we consider secrecy in terms of a
pair of two individual rates (RB0, RE0), whose secrecy region is shown in the light
shaded rectangular region of Fig. 3.9. In particular, we will seek to constrain the
information leakage to an eavesdropper (RE ≤ RE0) while transmitting a certain
amount of information to the destination (RB ≥ RB0). The outage probability of
this system is then defined as the probability of two independent events:
Pout = 1− P({log2(1+ γAB) ≥ RB0}
⋂{log2(1+ γAE) < RE0})
= 1−
(
e
−(2RB0−1)N0dαA,B
Es
)(
1− e
−(2RE0−1)N0dαA,E
Es
)
(3.6)
When there is no channel state information available at the transmitter, our secrecy
rate pair construction is important for a reliable and secure system. We first con-
sider a system with Alice and Bob a unit distance apart, Alice and Eve fixed at four
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units apart, a pathloss exponent of α = 2, a transmit SNR of 10 dB, and an outage
secrecy constraint of ϵ = 0.01. In a wiretap code design, we must design a rate pair
(RB0, RE0) that meets the secrecy outage constraint. But for the standard metric, we
are free to choose from a wide range of pairs to meet that constraint, as follows.
First, one sets P(RS < R0) = 0.01 in (3.5), and solves for R0. For the example here,
this yields R0 = 0.08. But this does not uniquely determine the pair (RB0, RE0), as
any pair such that RB0 − RE0 = 0.08 satisfies RS = 0.08. In Fig. 3.10, we consider
the secrecy outage performance for different possible pairs such that RS = 0.08; in
particular, the independent variable (x-axis) is RB0, which then determines RE0 as
RB0 − 0.08. For small RB0, the system does not require a very high rate at Bob, re-
sulting in a low probability of outage at Bob, but, in turn, this makes it easy for Eve
to intercept the packet. For a large RB0, one can then employ a large RE0, thereby
thwarting Eve’s attempts to intercept the packet, but now Bob’s probability of out-
age is unacceptably high. Note that there is no RB0 for which the secrecy outage
constraint is met due to the different (and, we would claim, insufficient) secrecy
outage region employed for the selection of R0 in this application (no CSI at the
transmitter), as shown in Fig. 3.9.
3.4 Secrecy with ARQ
The two different outage regions RB < RB0 and RE > RE0 also come with a
quite different costs, as interception of the message is more important than simply
the dropping of the packet (in which retransmission can be employed). In par-
ticular, we can exploit the use of automatic repeat request (ARQ) schemes [14],
keeping the eavesdropper intercept probability below the outage constraint while
maximizing throughput to the destination. In [43], results were shown to support
that hybrid ARQ systems for the Gaussian collision channel are not interference-
limited compared to conventional code division multiple access (CDMA). In addi-
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Figure 3.10: Probability of secrecy outage as a function of the rate RB0. The R0
from (3.5) that meets the outage constraint ϵ = 0.01 is R0 = 0.08; thus, for each
RB0, RE0 = RB0 − 0.08. The probability of outage at Bob and the complimen-
tary intercept probability at Eve is then shown for various possible wiretap codes
(RE0, RB0). None of the prescribed wiretap rate codes are sufficient in guaranteeing
the desired secrecy because of the different definition of the outage region in Fig.
3.9; either Eve’s probability of intercept is well above 0.01 or Bob’s probability of
outage is intolerable.
tion, Hybrid ARQ systems were considered for Rayleigh Block Fading channels in
[44], where the advantage of throughput for such a system, especially at practical
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of interest is shown. Also, [45] considered hybrid ARQ
protocols on Gaussian block-fading channels to establish connection and secrecy
outage, which characterizes the reliability and confidentially, respectively, of the
legitimate receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper.
Differently than [45, 46] in our work we consider the aforementioned secrecy
rate pair constraint formulation as a function of an eavesdropper at a varying dis-
tance away from the source. Given an eavesdropper location, it is of great interest
to determine the maximal secure throughput while meeting the intercept prob-
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ability constraint. Although, as stated earlier, many secrecy rate pairs can yield
the same instantaneous secrecy capacity, not all are created equal as the amount
of “goodput” or amount of information reliably transmitted to Bob influences the
optimal secrecy rate pair and overall maximum secure throughput. Additionally,
important especially to information-theoretic security is the case of a more com-
plex eavesdropper; therefore, we will consider the case in which the eavesdropper
uses a more robust receiver in comparison to the intended receiver.
In the following sections wewill explore twowidely used hybrid ARQ systems:
basic hybrid ARQ (Section 3.4.1), where there is no memory and the receiver only
provides the source with a single bit of feedback telling whether the packet was
received correctly, and hybrid ARQ with soft combining (Section 3.4.2), where the
receiver also buffers receptions and uses packet combining over multiple trans-
missions to increase the SNR of the received message. Differently, we will focus on
applying these HARQ techniques given the secrecy rate pair constraint aforemen-
tioned as will be demonstrated concretely later in this Chapter.
3.4.1 Basic Hybrid ARQ
An investigation into Fig. 3.9 shows that the unsecured dark shaded region
(red) has two sub regions that represent two events with very different implica-
tions in the application. The upper dark shaded triangle represents the region
where the eavesdropper rate (RE) is above the threshold (RE0). As discussed ear-
lier, this is the most costly form of outage: a secrecy breach. The lower dark shaded
triangle in Fig. 3.9 represents the area where the destination rate (RB) is below a
targeted threshold (RB0). In this region, automatic repeat request (ARQ) along
with retransmissions can be employed by the transmitter to achieve secrecy. If
the instantaneous SNR at the destination is below the threshold, an ARQ is trig-
gered to the transmitter to initiate a retransmission to the destination. In a basic
67
Hybrid ARQ (HARQ) scheme, the destination notifies the receiver if it receives
the packet successfully through the use of a positive acknowledgement/negative
acknowledgment (ACK/NAK) bit. We assume the feedback channel is noiseless;
therefore, the feedback is perfectly reliable. If the source receives a NAK, then the
source retransmits the same message until the destination successfully receives
the message, designated by an ACK. This leads to an extension of our secrecy rate
pair formulation: we put a constraint on the eavesdropper’s ability to intercept
a packet, including both the initial phase and retransmissions, while maximizing
the system throughput. The probability that the eavesdropper rate is above the
targeted threshold for a given transmission is:
P (log2(1+ γAE) ≥ RE0) = P
(
1+
|hA,E|2Es
N0dαA,E
≥ 2RE0
)
= e
−
(
2RE0−1
)
N0d
α
A,E
Es (3.7)
Likewise the probability of success at the destination for a given transmission is:
P
(
log2(1+ γAB) ≥ RB0
)
= e
−
(
2RB0−1
)
N0d
α
A,B
Es (3.8)
For simplicity of notation we will use τE =
(2RE0−1)N0dαA,E
Es
and τB =
(2RB0−1)N0dαA,B
Es
,
the thresholds on the fading for the Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve channels for
packet reception or packet interception, respectively, use throughout the Chapter.
For simplicity, define the following events:
• Ei: the packet is decoded by Eve on the ith transmission
• Bi: the packet is decoded by Bob on the ith transmission
• Ii: the packet is intercepted by Eve for the first time on the ith transmission.
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Noting that I1, I2, · · · are mutually exclusive and recalling the assumption that the
fading is independent for different transmissions of the packet:
P(I) = P
( ∞⋃
i=1
Ii
)
=
∞
∑
i=1
P(Ii)
=
∞
∑
i=1
P(log2(1+ γAB) < RB0)
i−1P(log2(1+ γAE) ≥ RE0)
P(log2(1+ γAE) < RE0)
i−1
= P(log2(1+ γAE) ≥ RE0)
∞
∑
i=0
P(log2(1+ γAB) < RB0)
i
P(log2(1+ γAE) < RE0)
i
=
P(RE ≥ RE0)
1− (1− P(RB ≥ RB0))(1− P(RE ≥ RE0))
=
e−τE
1− (1− e−τB)(1− e−τE) < ϵ (3.9)
Our goal is to pick the pair (RB0, RE0) such that P(I) < ϵ, while maximizing the av-
erage reliable throughput, which is simply the probability of successful reception
times the rate: e−τBR0 = e−τB(RB0 − RE0).
As discussed throughout the Chapter, we can exploit the use of HARQ to im-
prove the secrecy performance of the system. For the evaluation of this approach,
we consider the following environment: source and destination nodes at a unit
distance, the eavesdropper at some variable distance away from the source, a path
loss exponent of α = 2 and ESN0 = 10 dB. Fig. 3.11 shows the probability of packet
intercept achieved as a function of distance from Alice to Eve, where the inter-
cept probability constraint is set to ϵ = 0.01. Recall that this intercept constraint
must be met for a given packet not just for each individual transmission, but also
for the combination of the original and all retransmissions; in other words, Eve
has intercepted a packet if she obtains it on any transmission. This indicates why
this intercept probability is a function of both RE0 and RB0, as RB0 determines the
probability that Alice has to re-transmit a packet and hence impacts the number
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of chances Eve gets to intercept it. Among those rate pairs (RB0, RE0) meeting the
intercept constraint, the one providing the maximum throughput is selected.
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Figure 3.11: Probability of intercept of the message by the eavesdropper in the
basic HARQ system for the optimum secrecy rate pair (RB, RE) as a function of the
distance of the eavesdropper from the source 0.01 to 10 in 0.01 steps. To the find
the optimal pair, rates RB and RE were varied from 0.01 to 10.00 with 1000 points
considered for each individual rate to form a 1000 by 1000 rate pair grid. The rate
pair selected provides the maximum throughput while guaranteeing the intercept
probability ϵ = 0.01 at Eve. As expected, the intercept probability constraint is
always met.
Fig. 3.12 illustrates the maximum throughout for different distances of the
eavesdropper away from the source while satisfying an intercept probability of
ϵ = 0.01 for various transmit SNR. The plot shows that, as the SNR increases
the maximum throughput we can achieve greatly improves, especially as Eve gets
farther away from Alice. However, also as expected in a security setting, there
are diminishing returns as the SNR becomes very large, as the increased transmit
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power helps both the receiver and the eavesdropper. Notably, the secrecy rates
obtained for the same distance structure as those used in Fig. 3.10 are significantly
higher than the traditional scheme (R0 = 0.08). This is largely due to the ability to
perform retransmissions, the power of which has been observed in previous secu-
rity work for secure throughput [46] and key establishment [47]. In Fig. 3.13, we
assume a fixed transmit power ESN0 = 10 dB, but consider various path loss expo-
nents to show the effect on system performance as the transmit signals propagates
through different environments. As expected, as the path loss exponent increases,
the difference in effective average SNR between the main channel and eavesdrop-
per channel increases (since Eve is generally further away from Alice than Bob),
and thus the reliable secure throughput increases.
3.4.2 Hybrid ARQ: Soft Combining
Rather than discarding a packet, a receiver can store previous transmissions
as shown in Fig. 3.14. Once received samples are stored, the receiver can apply
soft combining to decode the message from the source. Various transmission tech-
niques exist to support soft combining at the receiver. Often, every transmission
sent by the source has the same information to increase the overall SNR of the re-
ceived message. Another commonly used technique is incremental redundancy
(IR) [43], where the initial transmission has the minimum redundant data, and ev-
ery retransmission onward incrementally adds more redundancy to increase the
likelihood of decoding the information correctly. In our work we consider the for-
mer case, where the information is repeated, although the incremental redundancy
case follows similarly, but with more complicated final expressions requiring nu-
merical integration.
We analyze system performance when soft combining is implemented for the
destination or eavesdropper. Of particular interest is how soft combining at the
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Figure 3.12: Maximum secure throughput with basic HARQ (i.e. neither Bob nor
Eve employ soft combining) as a function of the distance from Alice to Eve for
various EsN0 . The probability of intercept constraint for the eavesdropper is set to
ϵ = 0.01, the path loss exponent is α = 2, and the distance from Alice to Bob is one.
In each case, 1000 data points were considered. Note the significant rate gain pro-
vided by this approach over the traditional design when the distance from Alice to
Eve is 4.0 (yielding the same distance structure as considered for the generation of
Fig. 3.10).
eavesdropper, which improves its intercept capabilities, can limit the secrecy rate.
Thus, we first consider the case where only the eavesdropper employs soft packet
combining. Consider the event I2, the probability of first intercept on the first
retransmission:
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Figure 3.13: Maximum secure throughput with basic HARQ (i.e. neither Bob nor
Eve employ soft combining) as a function of the distance from Alice to Eve for
various α. The probability of intercept constraint for the eavesdropper is set to
ϵ = 0.01, the SNR is EsN0 = 10 dB, and the distance from Alice to Bob is one. In
each case, 1000 data points were considered. When α gets larger, the maximum
reliable secure throughput increases, as the SNR difference between the main and
eavesdropper channel grows.
P(I2) = P(E2
⋂
E1
⋂
B1) = P(B1)P(E2
⋂
E1)
= P(B1)P
({
log2(1+ γ
(1)
AE + γ
(2)
AE) ≥ RE0}
⋂{
log2(1+ γ
(1)
AE) < RE0
})
= P(B1)
∫ τE
0
∫ ∞
τE−x
e−xe−ydydx
=
(
1− e−τB
)
τEe
−τE (3.10)
where, recall that τB and τE are the fading gain thresholds, as defined in Section
3.4.1. Extending from the binary case, we consider the event IN, which is the event
that the eavesdropper intercepts the packet for the first time on the Nth transmis-
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Figure 3.14: Basic HARQ and HARQ with soft combining are shown. In both
schemes, Bob sends Alice an ACK if the message is receive successfully and a
NACK if unsuccessful. In the case of Basic HARQ, Bob discards messages if they
are receive unsuccessful but in HARQwith soft combining, Bob buffers incomplete
receptions and uses packet combining over multiple transmissions to increase the
SNR of the received message.
sion:
P(IN) = P(EN ∩ EN−1 ∩ ...E1)P(BN−1 ∩ BN−2 ∩ ...B1) (3.11)
74
Recall that each fading variable squared |hX,Y|2 is exponentially distributed with
parameter 1. The summation of N independent exponential random variables is
a Chi Square Distribution with 2N degrees of freedom, where Z = ∑Nn=1 X
2
n, with
Xn " N(0, σ2), σ = 12 [48, pg 41]. With fZ(x) the probability density function of Z,
evaluating the first term in (3.11) yields:
P(EN
⋂
EN−1
⋂
...E1) = P
({
log2
(
1+
N
∑
i=1
|h(i)A,E|2
)
≥ τE
})
⋂{
log2
(
1+
N−1
∑
i=1
|h(i)A,E|2
)
< τE
}
=
τE∫
0
∞∫
τE−x
fZ(x)e
−ydy dx =
τE∫
0
fZ(x)e
−(τE−x)dx
=
e−τE
σ2N2NΓ(N)
τE∫
0
xN−1e−x
(
1
2σ2
−1
)
dx
=
e−τE
σ2N2NΓ(N)
[
(N − 1)!
aN
− e−τEa
( N−1
∑
k=0
τN−k−1E (N − 1)!
ak+1(N − 1− k)!
)]
(3.12)
where Γ(N) = (N − 1)!, and a = 1
2σ2
− 1. If Bob still employs basic ARQ (i.e. no
soft combining), the second term in (3.11) is:
P(BN−1
⋂
BN−2
⋂
...B1) =
(
1− e−τB)N−1 (3.13)
Since the event of first intercept on the ith transmission is mutually exclusive of
the first intercept on any other transmission, the final expression for the probabil-
ity of intercept for the case where the destination does not store packets and the
eavesdropper stores packets and employs soft packet combining is:
∞
∑
N=1
P(IN) =
∞
∑
N=1
(
1− e−τB
)N−1 e−τE
σ2N2NΓ(N)[
(N − 1)!
aN
− e−τEa
( N−1
∑
k=0
τN−k−1E (N − 1)!
ak+1(N − 1− k)!
)]
(3.14)
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Finally, we consider the case where the destination additionally has the ability
to do packet combining; then,
P(BN−1
⋂
BN−2
⋂
...B1) =
1
σ2N2NΓ(N)[
(N − 1)!
bN
− e−τBb
(
n−1
∑
k=0
τN−k−1B (N − 1)!
bk+1(N − 1− k)!
)]
(3.15)
where b = 1
2σ2
, from which the analog to (3.14) is derived.
Lastly, Fig. 3.15 shows the maximum throughput when HARQ with soft com-
bining is use by one or both receivers over varying distances of Eve from Alice
while satisfying the intercept probability constraint. Fig. 3.15 illustrates the de-
crease in throughput when Eve has the ability to buffer packets and employ soft
combining; however, the throughput is still significantly higher than that obtained
by a one-shot scheme designed with the traditional approach.
3.5 Secrecy with ARQ for a Two-Hop Network
Especially in mesh or adhoc networks, limited direct communication can exist
between the source and the destination, perhaps due to bad geometries, distance
and/or fading. In the case of limited communication, the main link is at an out-
age state or more critical, high secrecy threat; the eavesdropper might have a high
probability of intercept on the main link. In these situations a relay node can as-
sist in the communication of the message. These multi-hop transmissions (e.g.
two-hop transmissions) fit into a broader class of transmission protocols called
cooperative communications [49]. In [50, 51], cooperative diversity was shown to
increase capacity and robustness for mobile users, where cooperation helps reduce
the total power for users to achieve a certain rate pair than with no cooperation,
thus extending battery life of mobile devices.
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Figure 3.15: Maximum secure throughput with HARQwith soft combining at Eve,
as a function of the distance from Alice to Eve. The probability of intercept con-
straint for the eavesdropper is set to ϵ = 0.01, the SNR is EsN0 = 10 dB, α = 2.0
and the distance from Alice to Bob is one. In each case, 1000 data points were
considered.
In [52], three different methods were considered, cooperative jamming (CJ),
amplitude-and-forward (AF) and decode-and-forward (DF). AF is a strategy used
where relay nodes amplify the noisy received signal and forward the noisy sig-
nal to the destination. Differently, in decode and forward, the relay node decodes
the received signal and, if correctly decoded, forwards the noiseless signal to the
destination. In [52], the authors compared the maximum secrecy rate from the
aforementioned cooperative techniques as opposed to direct transmission to the
destination, assuming optimal power allocation to the transmitting nodes. Also
discussed was the minimal power allocation to transmitting nodes to meet a spe-
cific secrecy rate, but the authors assumed that channel state information for the
eavesdropper is known. In this dissertation, we consider unknown channel state
information about the eavesdropper. In [53], a secure communication game where
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the relay helps the eavesdropper was investigated and showed the achievable se-
crecy rate. Then [54] considered multiple access channels where multiple users
communicate with a common receiver in the presence of an eavesdropper, and the
optimal transmit power allocation policy is chosen to maximize the secrecy sum-
rate.
Differently here we extend the existing secrecy rate pair hybrid ARQwork pre-
sented earlier to the two-hop network. Consider the two-hop network where the
source communicates via a relay because of either a bad fade, security threat, or
bad distance geometry to the destination. In the first hop, the source communi-
cates to the relay and the second hop, the relay communicates to the destination,
where the two-hop communication will be commonly referred to as the end-to-
end path. During the two-hop communication, potentially two eavesdroppers in-
dependently listen to each successive transmission. As in previous work, high im-
portance is placed on security: the eavesdropper at an outage. Security is a great
challenge in the described scenario because of the increase in the number of nodes
that the message traverses through in the end-to-end path. In addition, given a
total eavesdropper outage constraint on the end-to-end path, allocating the outage
constraint across each link is no trivial task. Moreover while maintaining outage
on each link at the eavesdropper, optimization of the end-to-end throughput re-
quires great attention because these pairs corresponds to the secrecy rate pairs for
the intended receivers and eavesdroppers. In summary the problem is formulated
as the following: maximize the overall secrecy throughput of the end-to-end path
while constraining the total end-to-end intercept probability:
minmax
{
eτB1 (RB1 − RE1) , eτB2 (RB2 − RE2)
}
(3.16)
s.t. ϵT = ϵ1 + ϵ2 (3.17)
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where RBi and REi represent the capacity of the legitimate transmitter receiver pair
and the capacity of the transmitter eavesdropper pair on link i respectively, ϵT
represents the total end-to-end intercept outage constraint partition to the relay
on link 1 and the destination on link 2, ϵ1 and ϵ2 respectively. Alternatively the
constraint (3.17) can be expanded to:
ϵT =
e−τE1
1− (1− e−τB1)(1− e−τE1 ) +
e−τE2
1− (1− e−τB2)(1− e−τE2 ) (3.18)
For simplicity of notation we will use τEi =
(2
REi−1)N0dαA,Ei
ES
, τBi =
(2
RBi−1)N0dαA,Bi
ES
, the
thresholds on the fading for the transmitter to the intended receiver i and transmit-
ter to eavesdropper i channels for packet reception or packet interception, respec-
tively. This sets the stage for an optimization problem where in the objective func-
tion we desire to figure out the best (R∗B1 , R
∗
E1
),(R∗B2 , R
∗
E2
) and ϵ1, ϵ2 for each link
to satisfy the total ϵT constraint given. The first approach to solve this problem is
a Lagrange multiplier solution (Appendix B) to figure out the optimal unknowns
but a solution cannot be found analytically satisfying the necessary conditions:
λ =⇒ e
−τEj
e
−τEj + e−τBj − e−τEj e−τBj
− ϵT = 0
τBj =⇒ −
(
e
−τBj
[
log2
(PsτBj + N0dαA,Bj
N0dαA,Bj
)
− log2
(PsτEj + N0dαA,Ej
N0dαA,Ej
)]
+
(
1− e−τBj) Ps
PsτBj + N0d
α
A,Bj
)
− λ −e
−τEj (e−τEj e−τBj − e−τBj)
(e
−τBj + e−τEj − e−τEj e−τBj)2
= 0
τEj =⇒
(
1− e−τBj) Ps
PsτEj + N0d
α
A,Ej
− λ
(−e−τEj (−e−τEj + e−τEj e−τBj)
(e
−τBj + e−τEj − e−τEj e−τBj)2
− e
−τEj
(e
−τEj + e−τBj − e−τEj e−τBj)
)
= 0
(3.19)
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The above problem requires the selection of five parameters (τB1 , τE1 , τB1 , τE2,
ϵ1). These unknown variables are very difficult to solve analytically as well as
numerically. These variables are highly dependent on the distances between the
transmitter, receiver, and eavesdropper nodes, which have a large impact on the
optimal τBi and τEi . Results from the one-hop problem show that for a fixed desti-
nation and intercept constraint, as the eavesdropper moves further away from the
transmitter, the secrecy capacity increases because we can tolerate a lower fading
constraint on the eavesdropper τE, thus reducing the rate RE.
First, we revisit the original one-hop secrecy rate pair formulation but look for
a solution where we can uniquely analytically figure out the optimal τB and τE that
yields the optimal (TP). Recall the following problem:
max e−τB
(
log2
(
1+
τBEs
N0dA,B
)
− log2
(
1+
τEEs
N0dA,E
))
(3.20)
s.t.
e−τE
1− (1− e−τB)(1− e−τE) = ϵT (3.21)
Since the intercept probability must be met on each and every hop, the eaves-
dropper intercept probability constraint from (3.21) can be used to derive τB as a
function of τE and the intercept probability constraint (ϵT) as follows:
τE = τB − log2(ϵT) + log2(1+ ϵTe−τB − ϵT)
≈ τB − log2(ϵT) (3.22)
where (3.22) results from the fact that log2(1+ ϵTe
−τB − ϵT) ≈ log2(1) = 0. This
approximation is validated in Fig. 3.16, where for small values of τB (τB < 1)
the error is less than 0.009, and for larger values τB the error is less than 0.0145.
Substituting τE into the objection function yields:
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Figure 3.16: The fading constraint for Bob (τB) is plotted versus the fading con-
straint for Eve (τE), where the the approximation (3.22) for the intercept constraint
is shown as a a very good estimate for the exact intercept constraint. This approx-
imation is validated since small values of τB (τB < 1) the error is less than 0.009,
and for larger values τB the error is less than 0.0145.
max e−τB
(
log2
(
1+
τBEs
N0dA,B
)
− log2
(
1+
(τB − log2(ϵT))Es
N0dA,E
))
(3.23)
where for positive throughput requires τBdA,B >
τB−log2(ϵT)
dA,E
. The trade-off for varying
τB:
• large τB translates to a high rate from Alice to Bob; higher threshold on the
fading, therefore higher probability of retransmissions; reliability concern
(e−τB → 0).
• small τB translates to a smaller rate from Alice to Bob; lower threshold on the
fading, therefore higher probability of success of the first transmission.
Given the optimization problem (3.23), without information on the distance ge-
ometries from Alice to Bob and Alice to Eve, there is no explicit solution. However
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an optimal τ∗B solution can be found for a given ϵT constraint and fixed dA,B as
a function of varying dA,E, as shown in Table 3.1. This case offers insight into a
solution we can use for the two-hop case.
dA,E τ
∗
B Tp
2 7.6 4.67 ∗ 10−5
4 3.0 0.0156
9 1.5 0.1599
16 1.1 0.3835
25 0.9 0.6162
49 0.7 1.0346
100 0.5 1.5210
1000 0.4 2.6250
Table 3.1: Ranges of SNR yield different optimal τ∗B ; hence there is not a single τ∗B
that optimizes the throughput function.
Further, to maximize the end-to-end throughput of the two-hop network, the
secrecy rates between the source-to-relay link and the relay-to-destination link,
these secrecy rates should be equivalent or as close to as possible so that the net-
work is not bottleneck. In other words, the network is limited by its weakest link;
therefore, the links rates should be equalized, thus reducing the optimization prob-
lem:
max e−τB1 (RB1 − RE1) = e−τB2 (RB2 − RE2) (3.24)
s.t. τE1 = τB1 − log2(ϵ1)
τE2 = τB2 − log2(ϵT − ϵ1) (3.25)
where, following from the single-hop case, an optimal τ∗B1 solution can be found
for a given ϵT constraint and fixed dA,B as a function of varying dA,E. For the two-
hop case described above, the following algorithm then solves the optimization
problem:
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Algorithm 1 Find the optimal (ϵ∗1 , ϵ∗2), and (TP1, TP2)
• Initialize the transmit SNR.
• Initialize the probability of outage constraint.
for varying Alice to Eve distance (dA,E1) on the first link do
for varying relay to Eve distance (dA,E2) on the second link do• Partition the probability of outage constraint equally on each link.
• Binary Search for the optimal probability of intercept constraint given
the system settings.
for varying ϵ1, ϵ2 do
if TP1 = TP2 then• the optimal end-to-end throughput is found, corresponding to
the optimal ϵ∗1 , ϵ∗2.
else
• Recursively call the binary search function.
end if
end for
end for
end for
In Algorithm 1, we first initialize the end-to-end intercept probability constraint
(ϵT), equally split the intercept probability constraint by link 1 (ϵ1) and the intercept
probability constraint by link 2 (ϵ2) to
ϵT
2 , and the transmit SNR
(
ES
N0
)
is set to the
desired power. Next for each distance geometry of the transmitter to eavesdropper
pair (dA,E1, dA,E2), we find the optimal τ
∗
Bi
, and TPi via a binary search on ϵi to sat-
isfy the condition TP1 = TP2 or, if at the end of the search, the value recorded corre-
sponds to the optimal ( min(TP1 ,TP2)) end-to-end throughput. Fig. 3.17 shows the
end-to-end secure throughput for varying distances of two eavesdroppers away
from the source where we find the optimal eavesdropper intercept constraint on
each link (ϵ1,ϵ2) following Algorithm 1. Consider the case of the intercept prob-
ability constraint on each link are equal (ϵ1 = ϵ2). In Fig 3.18, the eavesdropper
location of the first link is fixed at distance 1.41 units away from the source, while
the location of the second eavesdropper is vary at a distance between 6.40− 10.05
units away from the transmitting relay node. As the second eavesdropper gets
further away from the relay node, using an equality end-to-end intercept prob-
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Figure 3.17: The maximum throughput is plotted versus varying eavesdropper
distances (dE1, dE2) with the transmit SNR fixed at 20 dB, path-loss exponent of 2.
The maximum throughput is found using the algorithm 1 discussed. The point at
which the end-to-end throughput is maximized is when both eavesdroppers are
farthest away from transmitting nodes. This figure can serve as a database to the
achievable throughput given a pair of eavesdropper locations.
ability constraint (ϵ1 = ϵ2) has a damaging affect on throughput in comparison
to the aforementioned two-hop optimal end-to-end constraint. We conclude that
when the eavesdroppers distance from the transmitting nodes are unequal on both
links, our end-to-end constraint leads to an increase in the end-to-end throughput.
In other words if the eavesdroppers are at unequal distances from a transmitter
node, a more relaxed intercept constraint should be place on that corresponding
link (“trouble link”), while on the other hand, if an eavesdropper is further away
from the source, the intercept constraint should be strict.
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Figure 3.18: The maximum throughput is plotted for a fixed eavesdropper located
1.4 units away from the source versus a varying eavesdropper distance from the
relay (6.40− 10.05). The transmit SNR is fixed at 20 dB, the path-loss exponent is 2,
and the total intercept probability constraint (ϵT) is 0.01. Comparison of our end-
to-end constraint algorithm to an equal outage constraint on each link is shown.
Partitioning using our end-to-end constraint (i.e. allocating intercept constraint
to “trouble” link increases the secrecy rate) can achieve 55% increase in secure
throughput.
3.6 Conclusion
Physical layer security is vital to wireless communications, and secrecy out-
age is an important measure of the reliability of a scheme. We first considered
secrecy outage for the standard method, which, when channel state information is
unavailable at the transmitter: (1) ignores the fact that it is not possible to build a
universal wiretap code to cover the whole secrecy region required; and (2) treats all
types of outage equitably. Next, a new outage formulation was presented where
we consider rate pair design under the outage constraint, maintaining separate
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rate thresholds for the channels to each of the destination (Bob) and eavesdropper
(Eve). The new secrecy rate pair formulation reveals two unsecured regions for
the standard formulation and motivates the application of hybrid ARQ to achieve
secrecy. We design such an ARQ scheme to maximize throughput to Bob while
constraining the intercept probability at Eve, while accounting for her ability to in-
tercept the packet on the first or any retransmission (or, in the case of soft combin-
ing, some combination of the initial transmission and retransmissions). Numerical
results are provided that demonstrate the utility of the definition and the signifi-
cant secrecy rate improvements that can be obtained through the hybrid ARQ ap-
proach. Soft combining at the eavesdropper reduces the reliable secure throughput
somewhat, but even much of this loss can be recouped if the legitimate receiver
also employs soft combining. Later in the Chapter we extended our ARQ work
to the two-hop case where we optimally solved for the best intercept constraint
by eavesdroppers on the first and second link given an end-to-end intercept con-
straint. This resulted in an algorithm that favors allocating most of the intercept
constraint to the “trouble link”, i.e. the link where the eavesdropper is close to the
transmitter.
In summary, information-theoretic security has shown many advantages over
traditional cryptographic security. However information-theoretic security gener-
ally requires an advantage of the main channel over the eavesdropper channel. In
the work described in this Chapter, the advantage came from the exploitation of
the ubiquitous randomness in the wireless channel; fading. A weakness in this
solution is the case when the eavesdropper is close to the source in which case
minimal to null secrecy rate is achievable. In the next Chapter we will discuss a
solution used to alleviate the near eavesdropper case.
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CHAPTER 4
POWER ALLOCATION TO NOISE-GENERATINGNODES FOR
COOPERATIVE SECRECY IN THEWIRELESS ENVIRONMENT
The wireless transmission environment opens up opportunities for an eaves-
dropper to intercept a secret message from the source to the legitimate destination,
particularly in the case when the eavesdropper is close to the source. Coopera-
tive jamming, where nodes that are inactive serve as noise-generating nodes to
disrupt an eavesdropper, has recently been considered in wireless communication
networks to improve secrecy in such scenarios. Here we consider optimal power
allocation to these jamming nodes (termed “chatterers”) in the case of an eaves-
dropper of known location. The optimal power allocation to the chatterer nodes
is achieved via a form of water-filling that, as one would expect, favors nodes that
are close to the eavesdropper but will not impact the message to the destination
significantly, either because the chatterer is located at a large distance from the des-
tination or because the chatterer’s signal is significantly faded at the destination.
Numerical results compare the performance of the system employing the optimal
power allocation to the performance of lower overhead schemes that employ only
a single jamming node.
4.1 Introduction
In modern wireless communication applications such as transmissions from
laptops, cellular phones, and sensor networks, secrecy can be very difficult to ob-
tain due to the properties of the wireless medium, where the signal range is not
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readily physically constrained. In particular, a message between a sender Alice
and receiver Bob can be intercepted and/or jammed by an eavesdropper Eve. This
can be a challenging problem because of the range of locations for Eve as seen
in Chapter 3; an eavesdropper close to the transmitter has a significant signal-to-
noise ratio (SNR) advantage over a distant receiver for reception, and a jammer
near the receiver has a significant SNR advantage over the transmitter that can be
employed to disrupt communication.
The traditional method to obtain secrecy as discussed in Section 3.1.1 is cryp-
tography. In summary cryptography assumes an eavesdropper can perfectly listen
to the message but its computational abilities restrict it from correctly decoding the
message; hence, eavesdroppers near the source are accounted, which is of great
value in the wireless environment. However if an eavesdropper has infinite com-
putational abilities or stores the message for later decryption, security might be
compromised.
Recall fromChapter 3 that Shannon [22] presented secrecy from an information-
theoretic and physical layer background where he first considered transmission
over a noiseless channel. Shannon’s work assumes the adversary has perfect recep-
tion of the message and infinite computational abilities. In this case, he concluded
(quite negatively) that secrecy required a key as long as the message. In a con-
tinuation of Shannon’s work, Wyner considered secrecy over a noisy channel and
introduced the wiretap channel [13]. Wyner’s main result was that, if the channel
from the source to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of the channel from the
source to the destination, then perfect secrecy is achievable. Perfect secrecy means
the source can transmit a message to the destination confidentially with the eaves-
dropper obtaining no information about the message. But, if the channel from the
source to the eavesdropper is better than the source to destination, then secrecy
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may not be achievable, which can occur in wireless systems if the eavesdropper is
close to the source (the “near eavesdropper” problem).
One solution offered to the near eavesdropper problem was noise forwarding
[25], where relay nodes send dummy codewords independent of the source mes-
sage to confuse the eavesdropper. Another solution offered was cooperative jam-
ming [26], where nodes not used in the relay transmission of the message but in
close proximity to the eavesdropper introduce artificial random noise to degrade
the message received at the eavesdropper. Contrary to noise forwarding, coop-
erative jamming allows the relay to harm the eavesdropper more than it harms
the receiver. In [26], it was shown that a non-zero rate of secrecy can be achieved
regardless of the eavesdropper location. In [27], cooperative jamming techniques
that introduce artificial noise are again used to achieve secrecy. A protocol is in-
troduced where system nodes that are not employed as relay nodes and that have
a bad channel to the receiver (and hence will not interfere significantly with the
message transmission), transmit random noise to confuse the eavesdropper. Re-
sults show that perfect secrecy can be achieved with high probability for a large
number of randomly located eavesdroppers in the asymptotic case of a large num-
ber of systems nodes.
In this chapter we consider a similar but more practical case with a finite num-
ber of nodes. Given channel state information between all pairs of system nodes,
it is possible to keep the destination out of outage if the aggregate chatterer power
impinging on the receiver is constrained. This forms a constraint on the chatterer
power, and we then investigate the optimal allocation of this power budget to the
noise generating nodes, which we call “chattering nodes”, with the goal of maxi-
mally degrading the eavesdropper signal. More formally, we guarantee a desired
signal-to-interference plus noise ratio (SINR) at the destination while maximizing
the probability that the eavesdropper cannot meet its (often lower) SINR threshold.
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The problem formulation leads to a traditional water-filling result, where we
allot power to chatterer nodes that are close to the eavesdropper and far from the
destination, or whose signal will be badly faded when it arrives at the destination.
The communication between the source-to-destination may not be reliable, or
evenmore important an eavesdropper may have a high probability to intercept the
message, in which case a relay node can introduce transmit or security diversity to
help in the end-to-end secure communication. Thus, next we focus on the optimal
reliability outage allocation for the source-to-relay and relay-to-destination link
while minimizing the probability of intercept to Eve.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
systemmodel andmetrics. Section 4.3 considers the optimal allocation of power to
the chatterers, establishes the water-filling result, provides simulations examples,
and discussion. Section 4.4 considers the two-hop network and optimal power
allocation to chatters optimizing the outage constraint to the source-to-relay and
relay-to-destination link. Finally, Section 4.5 provides the conclusions.
4.2 SystemModel and Metrics
4.2.1 Model
We consider the two-dimensional (2-D) network shown in Fig. 4.1, where a
source node S (Alice) wishes to communicate to a destination node D (Bob) in
the presence of a passive eavesdropper node E (Eve). Also present are potential
“chattering” nodes, Ch1,Ch2, ...Chn−1, also known as jammers, used to disrupt the
reception of the signal by the eavesdropper. The ith transmitted symbol of the
source node S is denoted by x
(S)
i , and the i
th received symbol for the eavesdrop-
per E and the destination node D will be denoted by y
(E)
i and y
(D)
i respectively.
We assume frequency non-selective Rayleigh fading between each of the active
transmitters and receivers, where hA,B is the multipath fading on a link from a
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Figure 4.1: Alice attempting to secretly communicate to Bob (dashed blue arrow)
in the presence of Eve and two chatter nodes (Chatter 2, Chatter 5) generating
artificial noise to degrade Eve’s received signal (green dashed lines).
given transmitter A to a given receiver B and is a complex zero-mean (complex)
Gaussian random variable. The multipath fading is assumed to be constant over
the duration of a codeword and independent for each distinct transmitter-receiver
pair. The received signal at the eavesdropper and destination are, respectively:
y(E)i =
hS,E√
dαS,E
√
Esx
(S)
i + n
(E)
i
y
(D)
i =
hS,D√
dαS,D
√
Esx
(S)
i + n
(D)
i
where Es is the transmitted energy per symbol, dA,B is the distance between node A
and B, α is the path-loss exponent, n(E)i and n
(D)
i are zero-mean Gaussian random
variables with variance N0, and, based on the Rayleigh fading assumption, |hA,B|2
is exponentially distributed with parameter 1. Throughout, we will assume that
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the locations of all nodes, including that of the eavesdropper, are known, and that
the channel gain hA,B for system nodes A and B is available (e.g. measured by
pilots). Because of the assumption of a passive eavesdropper Eve, the value of hS,E
is assumed to be unknown.
4.2.2 Metric
In this section we describe themetric onwhich the power optimization is based.
The source S transmits the message to destination D, while the chatter nodes, Ch1,
Ch2, ..., Chn−1 transmit omnidirectional random Gaussian noise to create interfer-
ence at the eavesdropper, E. Hence, conditioned on the channel fading gains, a
Gaussian wiretap channel is obtained, whose instantaneous rate is given by
R = log2(1+ SINRD)− log2(1+ SINRE) (4.1)
where SINRD and SINRE are the signal-to-interference plus noise ratios at the
destination and eavesdropper, respectively, as given below. Now, suppose that we
want to maintain a secrecy rate R0 in our system. At first glance, it appears that
one should design the system to maximize the probability that the ordered pair
(SINRD , SINRE) results in an R via (4.1) that is greater than R0. However, given
that a system would likely employ a single wiretap code in implementation, we
consider a different approach.
Consider Figure 4.2. As discussed in detail in Chapter 3, whereas all (SINRD ,
SINRE) curves that lie below the R = 2 curve would satisfy the secrecy condition,
there is not a single wiretap code that would be effective for all such cases. In par-
ticular, if one employs a wiretap code designed at (γD,γE), it will only be effective
if both SINRD > γD and SINRE < γE. Hence, rather than maximizing the proba-
bility of SINR rate pairs (SINRD , SINRE) that result in an R via (4.1) that is greater
than R0, we consider constraints on both SINRD and SINRE; in other words, we
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consider a region given by one of the rectangles in Figure 4.2.
Since the channel state information is known for the channels between any pair of
system nodes, it is possible to guarantee the desired SINR γD at the destination;
that is, we will constrain:
SINRD =
|hS,D|2Ps
dαS,D
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,D|2PChi
dαChi,D
= γD (4.2)
where Ps is the amount of power transmitted by the source, and PChi is the power
of the ith chatter node. Likewise the (instantaneous) received SINR at the eaves-
dropper is denoted as:
SINRE =
|hS,E|2Ps
dαS,E
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,E|2PChi
dαChi,E
(4.3)
In this case, |hS,E|2 is not known to the system, and thus SINRE < γE cannot
be guaranteed. Thus, we instead seek to maximize the probability of this event.
Hence, our optimization criterion is established: maximize eavesdropper outage
P(SINRE < γE) given the destination receives themessage successfully (SINRD =
γD).
4.3 Optimal Power Allocation
First, consider the intercept probability at Eve:
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Figure 4.2: Secrecy curve of rate 2 is showed with dashed lines. The areas under
the rectangles show the achievable regions of secrecy for two different codes.
P(SINRE > γE) = P
⎛⎜⎜⎝
|hS,E|2Ps
dαS,E
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,E|2PChi
dαChi,E
> γE
⎞⎟⎟⎠
= E{|hChi,E|2,i=1,2,...,N}[
P
(
|hS,E|2 > γE
(
N0
2
+
N
∑
i=1
|hChi,E|2PChi
dαChi,E
)(
dαS,E
Ps
))]
= E{|hChi,E|2,i=1,2,...,N}
⎡⎢⎣e−
(
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,E|
2PChi
dαChi,E
)(
γEd
α
S,E
Ps
)⎤⎥⎦
= M · E{|hChi,E|2,i=1,2,...,N}
⎡⎢⎣e−γE ∑Ni=1 |hChi,E|
2PChi
dα
Chi,E
dαS,E
Ps
⎤⎥⎦
= M ·
N
∏
i=1
E|hChi,E|2
⎡⎢⎣e−γE |hChi,E |
2PChi
dα
Chi,E
dαS,E
Ps
⎤⎥⎦
= M ·
N
∏
i=1
1
1+
PChi
dαChi,E
dαS,E
Ps
γE
(4.4)
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where M = e−γE
N0
2
dαS,E
Ps is the intercept probability without chatter. Our motive is
to minimize (4.4), which is equivalent to minimizing the log of (4.4).
min
PChi
γE
N0
2
dαS,E
Ps
−
N
∑
i=1
ln
(
1+
PChi
dαChi,E
dαS,E
Ps
γE
)
(4.5)
s.t.
|hS,D|2Ps
dαS,D
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,D|2PChi
dαChi,D
= γD, PChi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...,N (4.6)
The first constraint implies:
N
∑
i=1
|hChi ,D|2PChi
dαChi,D
=
|hS,D|2Ps
dαS,DγD
− N0
2
(4.7)
Now, define
P˜Chi = PChi
|hChi,D|2
dαChi,D
(4.8)
Then, the problem is:
max
P˜Chi
N
∑
i=1
ln
(
1+
dαChi,D
dαChi,E
dαS,E
|hChi ,D|2Ps
P˜ChiγE
)
(4.9)
s.t.
N
∑
i=1
P˜Chi =
|hS,D|2Ps
dαS,DγD
− N0
2
, P˜Chi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...N (4.10)
Therefore the solution that maximizes capacity is a similar result to that for parallel
Gaussian channels:
P˜Chi = (r − Ni)+ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ (r− Ni), if r− Ni ≥ 00, if r− Ni < 0 (4.11)
where in our optimization problem Ni is equivalent to
|hChi,D|2PsdαChi,E
dαS,Ed
α
Chi,D
γE
. Thus, the
power is distributed via water-filling [55] and then (4.8) is used to find the chatterer
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power. In other words chatterers that are geometrically, very close to an eaves-
dropper and far away from the destination together with having a bad fade to
the destination will be allocated the most power. This should match our intuition
since we desire to maximally decrease the eavesdropper intercept probability (i.e.
chatter close to an eavesdropper) together with not interfering with the source-to-
destination communication (i.e. chatter far from and bad fade to the destination).
4.3.1 Toy Example
Fig. 4.3 shows the performance of the scenario that consists of a Alice, Bob, and
Evewith 5 system nodes. In this example we considered γD as fixed at 10 dB, while
an eavesdropper intercepts the packet if it is above the lower threshold γE = 5 dB.
Also, the 5 system nodes are placed at 4 different geometries for 0, 1, 5, and a ran-
dom number of chatter nodes placed close to an eavesdropper, as summarized in
Table 4.1. As described in the previous section, the power distribution to system
nodes follows the water-filling algorithm, allocating power to system nodes that
degrade the eavesdropper ability to intercept a message while minimally affecting
the source-to-destination communication. Also in Table 4.1 we highlight some of
the key parameters captured in the toy example. First, in the case where we have
a random set of system nodes or N = 1 system node close to Eve yields approxi-
mately the same intercept probability by Eve. We see that when 5 system nodes are
placed close to Eve, that we see≈ 85% reduction in intercept probability. The inter-
cept values by Eve for the other cases, e.g. when N = 5 system nodes are not close
to Eve are unsatisfactory. As will be explained in more detail in Section 4.3.3, we
can heavily reduce the intercept probability by Eve, by allowing outage (not trans-
mit) at the destination when the intercept probability by Eve is above a threshold.
Fig. 4.4 shows the intercept probability by Eve performance as a function of the
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amount of outage we allow to the destination. We can see there is significant gain
employing the aforementioned scheme.
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Figure 4.3: Probability of intercept of the message by Eve versus probability of
outage for the destination, for N = 5 system nodes present with a transmit SNR
of 20 dB, and Alice, Eve, and Bob are fixed at (0.0, 0.50), (0.20, 0.20), (1.00, 0.50)
respectively. There different scenarios are considered, N = 5, 3, 1 system nodes are
close to the eavesdropper andN = 5 randomly present system nodes. The pathloss
exponent is set to α = 2, the required SINR at the destination is set to γD = 10,
and the required SINR at the eavesdropper is set to γE = 5. Each data point is
the result of 10,000 trials. For each trial, the optimal chattering computed, and
the eavesdropper intercept probability is calculated. The eavesdropper intercept
probability is averaged over those trials when the system was not in outage
4.3.2 Set Up
The wireless scenario considered is shown in Figure 4.5. The wireless link op-
erates on the region [0, 1]× [0, 1], with the source located on the left side at coordi-
nates (0.00, 0.50) and the destination on the right side at coordinates (1.00, 0.50). In
between are N system nodes and an eavesdropper, all of which are uniformly dis-
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Figure 4.4: Probability of intercept of the message by Eve versus probability of out-
age for the destination, for N = 5 system nodes present with a transmit SNR of 20
dB, and Alice, Eve, and Bob are fixed at (0.00, 0.50), (0.20, 0.20), (1.00, 0.50) respec-
tively. There different scenarios are considered, N = 5, 3, 1 system nodes are close
to the eavesdropper and N = 5 randomly present system nodes. The pathloss
exponent is set to α = 2, the required SINR at the destination is set to γD = 10,
and the required SINR at the eavesdropper is set to γE = 5. Each data point is
the result of 10,000 trials. For each trial, the optimal chattering computed, and the
eavesdropper intercept probability is calculated. Then, per the text, the system em-
ploys its knowledge of this eavesdropper intercept probability to decide when the
eavesdropper intercept probability will be too high and accepts an outage for the
destination in those situations. The eavesdropper intercept probability is averaged
over those trials when the system was not in outage
tributed at random across the region. Note that this scenario emphasizes the near
eavesdropper problem, since the eavesdropper will likely be closer to the source
than the destination. The parameters of the system are set as follows: the pathloss
exponent is set to α = 2, the required SINR at the destination is set to γD = 10, the
required SINR at the eavesdropper (which we want to insure the received SINR
is less than) is set to γE = 5. The ratio of the transmit power Ps to N0, which we
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Nodes close to Eve γ1 Chatter Locations Pint
5 0.00 (0.25, 0.25), (0.15, 0.15), (0.30, 0.30),(0.01, .10),(0.20, 0.30) 0.11
5 0.30 (0.25, 0.25), (0.15, 0.15), (0.30, 0.30),(0.01, .10),(0.20, 0.30) 0.01
1 0.00 (0.80, 0.80), (0.75, 0.75), (0.50, 0.50),(0.40, .80),(0.30, 0.30) 0.42
1 0.30 (0.80, 0.80), (0.75, 0.75), (0.50, 0.50),(0.40, .80),(0.30, 0.30) 0.17
0 0.00 (0.80, 0.80), (0.75, 0.75), (0.50, 0.50),(0.40, .80),(1.00, 0.10) 0.75
0 0.30 (0.80, 0.80), (0.75, 0.75), (0.50, 0.50),(0.40, .80),(1.00, 0.10) 0.46
Random 0.00 random 0.46
Random 0.30 random 0.19
Table 4.1: Alice, Bob and Eve are fixed at (0.00, 0.50),(1.00, 0.50), and (0.20, 0.20)
respectively. Transmit SNR is set to 20 dB. The required SINR is set to 10 dB at
the destination and the eavesdropper intercepts the packet if its SINR is above the
threshold 5 dB. Probability of intercept by Eve is show for 4 different scenarios:
N = 0, 1, 5, and random number of nodes are placed close to the eavesdropper.
Also, considered is the case of allowing outage by Bob and the corresponding se-
curity performance.
ES R D
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C5
Figure 4.5: Two-Dimensional (2-D) scenario where the source, and destination are
located at (0.00, 0.50), (1.00, 0.50) respectively. Also, 5 system nodes are randomly
placed which can possibly serve as chatter nodes.
will call the “transmit SNR”, will be varied as the independent variable. Since the
path-loss between the source and destination is always fixed at one, this will also
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be the average received SNR. We will vary the transmit SNR from just above γD to
much higher values. Although the eavesdropper also benefits from a higher trans-
mit power, larger gaps between the transmit SNR and γD allow us to introduce
more chatter to thwart the eavesdropper until saturation occurs, as observed and
discussed below.
The simulation runs as follows. For each trial, the N system nodes and the
eavesdropper E are randomly placed. Next, the (independent) fading values be-
tween all pairs of nodes are randomly generated. Recall that the location of the
eavesdropper is known to the system, and the fading value between any pair of
system nodes is assumed known, but the fading value for any link between a sys-
tem node and the eavesdropper is unknown. The constraint on the chatterer pow-
ers such that γD is met at the destination is then calculated, and then water-filling
as described in the previous section is employed to find P˜Chi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N, which
then leads directly to the chatterer powers PChi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N. The chatterer pow-
ers are then used to calculate the probability that the eavesdropper is in outage.
This latter is averaged over the trials to produce the eavesdropper outage proba-
bility. We employed 10,000 trials for each simulation point unless otherwise noted.
4.3.3 Results
First, consider the difficulty of the near eavesdropper problem using simple
one-way wireless transmission without any chattering. For this, we ran the system
shown in Figure 4.5 with N = 0 (no system nodes except the source and destina-
tion) with the parameters given above with a transmit SNR ranging from 13 to 30
dB. We found that the eavesdropper is unlikely to be in outage, with a probability
of outage starting at around 5% at 13.0 dB and decreasing with further increasing
transmit SNR, as expected; hence, the message is nearly always intercepted by the
eavesdropper. Next, we added N chatterers to the system and repeated the ex-
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periment for N = 3, 10, 20, and 50 using the power setting derived in this work.
The results are shown in Figure 4.6. Note that the results are relatively invariant to
SNR, as expected. Although the SNR at the destination without chatter needs to
be higher than γD to allow some chatter, increasing the transmit SNR also makes it
easier for the eavesdropper to intercept the message and performance eventually
saturates.
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Figure 4.6: Probability of intercept of the message by Eve versus transmit SNR
when N system nodes are present in the system for the scenario of Figure 4.5. The
pathloss exponent is set to α = 2, the required SINR at the destination is set to γD =
10, and the required SINR at the eavesdropper is set to γE = 5. Each data point is
the result of 10,000 trials. For each trial, the nodes are randomly placed, the optimal
chattering computed, and the eavesdropper intercept probability is calculated. The
result shown is the average of the eavesdropper intercept probability over all trials.
The results shown in Figure 4.6 are not satisfactory, as even a large number of
potential chatterers (N = 50) and a large transmit SNR does not lead to a very
secure system with only a probability of intercept slightly less than 10%, which
would be unacceptable in practice. However, from the simulations, we notice that
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the intercept probability is dominated by a few bad geometries and fading situa-
tions. In other words, occasionally: (1) the eavesdropper is right near the source,
or (2) the source to destination link experiences severe multipath fading, which
allows for almost no chattering. In fact, the intercept probability at the eavesdrop-
per can be quite close to one in some situations. However, note that, given its
knowledge of the location of the eavesdropper and the chatterer power employed,
the system is able to calculate P(SINRE > γE) while operating. In practice, the
system could simply not transmit when P(SINRE > γE) is larger than an accept-
able threshold. This would lead to the potential for outage for the destination, but
hopefully at a significantly decreased probability of intercept for the eavesdrop-
per. The results from such an exercise are shown in Figure 4.7. As expected, the
eavesdropper intercept probability drops rapidly as we allow some outage at the
destination. Hence, if there is no delay constraint and nodes are mobile the desti-
nation can significantly reduce the probability that a packet is intercepted by the
eavesdropper with a mild reduction in data rate.
Finally, with the goal of simplifying the implementation, we consider a scheme
where only a single node chatters. There are multiple possibilities here. For ex-
ample, one could have the node closest to the eavesdropper chatter, which would
not require the transmission of channel state information as the fading evolves.
However, a more effective method is to increase the power of the relay, that, after
the waterfilling allocation of power to PChi , i = 1, 2, . . . ,N, has the largest impact on
the eavesdropper outage, which is equivalent to selecting the relay with the largest
PChi/d
α
Chi ,E
. We hasten to note that this is not necessarily the optimal selection of a
single node for chattering but will give us an idea of how closely the use of a single
node can approach the optimal use of all nodes. The results are shown in Figure
4.8. Comparing Figures 4.6 and 4.8, we see that the loss from employing only a
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Figure 4.7: Probability of intercept of the message by Eve versus probability of out-
age for the destination, for N = 10, N = 20 and N = 50 system nodes present with
a transmit SNR of 20 dB. The pathloss exponent is set to α = 2, the required SINR
at the destination is set to γD = 10, and the required SINR at the eavesdropper is
set to γE = 5. Each data point is the result of 10,000 trials. For each trial, the nodes
are randomly placed, the optimal chattering computed, and the eavesdropper in-
tercept probability is calculated. Then, per the text, the system employs its knowl-
edge of this eavesdropper intercept probability to decide when the eavesdropper
intercept probability will be too high and accepts an outage for the destination in
those situations. The eavesdropper intercept probability is averaged over those
trials when the system was not in outage.
single well-chosen node is often small, particularly when only a small number of
system nodes are available.
4.4 Two-hop Network
Communication is not always widely available between the source and desti-
nation. In this case a relay node is needed to assist in the end-to-end communica-
tion. Relay node helps with wireless diversity and reliability of the message to the
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Figure 4.8: Probability of intercept of the message by Eve versus transmit SNR
when N system nodes are present in the system for the scenario of Figure 4.5, but
with only a single node producing chatter. The pathloss exponent is set to α = 2,
the required SINR at the destination is set to γD = 10, and the required SINR at
the eavesdropper is set to γE = 5. Each data point is the result of 10,000 trials. For
each trial, the nodes are randomly placed and the optimal chattering computed.
Then, the node with the largest impact on the eavesdropper intercept probability
is allocated all of the power (i.e. including that it was not allocated before) so that
only a single node chatters. The results shown are the average of the eavesdropper
intercept probability over all trials.
destination. We consider a two-hop network where the source communicates to
the destination via a relay, and an eavesdropper listens to two independent trans-
mission attempts to maliciously intercept the message. As explained earlier in this
section, chatter nodes will be used to aid in the secrecy while maintaining the de-
sired reliability of the message. Under these circumstances we seek to find the
optimal allocation of the end-to-end total reliability constraint on the source-to-
relay link and relay-to-destination link that minimizes the end-to-end probability
of intercept by Eve. Similarly to earlier work, we introduce a fixed outage to each
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link to further minimize the probability of intercept by Eve, but, choose the optimal
outage to each link. First Recall :
SINREj =
|hS,Ej |2PS
dαS,Ej
(
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,Ej |2PChi
dαChi,Ej
) (4.12)
for i = 1, 2, where SINRE1 , SINRE2 is the independent SINR received at the eaves-
dropper from the first and second transmission respectively.
SINRBj =
|hS,Bj |2PS
dαS,Bj
(
N0
2 +∑
N
i=1
|hChi,Bj |2PChi
dαChi,Bj
) (4.13)
for i = 1, 2, where SINRB1 ,SINRB2 , is the SINR constraint at the relay and destina-
tion respectively.
Consider the probability of secrecy outage due to Eve intercepting the message:
P(I) = P(I1 ∪ I2) = P(I1) + P(I2)− P(I1 ∩ I2)
= P(I1) + P(I2)− P(I1)P(I2)
≈ P (SINRE1 > γE) + P (SINRE2 > γE) (4.14)
where (4.14) used the fact that the the eavesdropper intercept probability on each
link is independent, and the end-to-end intercept probability is the union of the
intercept on the first and second transmission. Similarly to the result in Section
4.3, we get:
e
− dS,E1γEN02PS
N
∏
i=1
1
1+
PChid
α
S,E1
γE
PSd
α
Chi,E1
+ e
− dS,E2γEN02PS
N
∏
i=1
1
1+
PChid
α
S,E2
γE
PSd
α
Chi,E2
(4.15)
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The optimization problem is the following:
max
P˜Chi
N
∑
i=1
ln
(
1+
dαChi,Bj
dαChi,Ej
dαS,Ej
|hChi ,Bj |2PS
P˜ChiγE
)
(4.16)
s.t.
N
∑
i=1
P˜Chi =
|hS,Bj |2PS
dαS,BjγBj
− N0
2
, P˜Chi ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, ...N (4.17)
where P˜Chi =
PChi |hChi,Bi |2
dChi,Bj
. Similarly to the single hop case, leads to water-filling
solution:
P˜Chi = (r − Nj,i)+ =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩ (r− Nj,i), if r− Nj,i ≥ 00, if r− Nj,i < 0 (4.18)
Nj,i =
|hChi,Bj |2PSdαChi,Ej
dαS,Ejd
α
Chi,Bj
γE
(4.19)
We saw from the earlier Section 4.3 that allowing for outage at the legitimate re-
ceiver leads to significant gain in minimizing the probability of intercept at the
eavesdropper. The optimization problem will determine the optimal outage to the
relay (link 1) and destination (link 2) such that we minimize the end-to-end prob-
ability of intercept. In the next section we will discuss the algorithm used and
simulation results for the aforementioned optimization problem.
4.4.1 Set Up
The wireless scenario considered is shown in Figure 4.9. The wireless link op-
erates on the region [0, 1] × [0, 1], with the source located on the left side at co-
ordinates (0.00, 0.50), the relay in the middle at coordinates (0.50, 0.50), and the
destination on the right side at coordinates (1.00, 0.50). In between are N system
nodes and an eavesdropper, all of which are placed at random across the region.
As explained earlier in the chapter, this scenario emphasizes the near eavesdropper
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problem, since the eavesdropper will likely be closer to the source than the desti-
nation. The parameters of the system are set as follows: the pathloss exponent is
set to α = 2, the required SINR at the relay and destination is set to γBj = 10, the
required SINR at the eavesdropper is set to γE = 5. The “transmit SNR” is fixed at
20 dB.
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Figure 4.9: Alice communicates to Bob via a Relay node in the presence of Eve.
Also in the environment are 10 system nodes of which Chatter 2 and Chatter 5
mostly contribute artificial noise to disrupt the eavesdropper while having mini-
mal effect on the two hop transmission.
We will consider two different toy examples to illustrate the importance on
choosing the optimal reliability outage constraint to the relay and destination, γ1,
and γ2 respectively. In the first example Fig. 4.10a, the eavesdropper is fixed at po-
sition (0.01, 0.50), extremely close to the source, one of the most vulnerable regions
in the system. In the next example, Fig. 4.10b, we consider the eavesdropper fixed
extremely close to the destination at (0.99, 0.50). These toy examples show how
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the performance with an optimal choice of γ1,γ2 compares to the performance if
we had just decided to allocate γ1 = γ2.
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“Trouble Link” 
(a) Toy Example 1: Eve extremely close to the
source.
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(b) Toy Example 2: Eve extremely close to the
destination.
Figure 4.10: These two examples show two different cases where outage is mostly
allocated to the trouble link.
To figure out the optimal source-to-relay outage (γ1) and relay-to-destination
outage (γ2), minimizing the end-to-end intercept probability of the eavesdropper,
we used the following Algorithm:
Algorithm 2 Find the optimal transmitter-receiver outage constraint (γ1, γ2).
• Initialize γT.
• Initialize γ1, γ2 to add up to γT.
for each γ1 < γT do
• water-fill on link 1 and record the optimal probability of intercept to Eve
(P(1)int ).• water-fill on link 2 and record the optimal probability of intercept to Eve
(P(2)int ).
• Add the end-to-end intercept probability (P(T)int = P(1)int + P(2)int ).
end for
Return min(P(T)int )← γ∗1,γ∗2
4.4.2 Results
Very important in the two-hop scenario is the link on which the eavesdropper
has a higher probability of intercepting a message. If the eavesdropper location is
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unknown or equally far from the source and relay, then its best to allocate the out-
age to the legitimate receivers equally as shown in Fig. 4.11. However in the case
when the eavesdropper favors one link then its very important to allocate more
outage to the “ trouble link”. To highlight the significance of outage allocation to
the available links lets consider the toy examples set up from Section 4.4.1.
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Figure 4.11: Alice, relay, Bob, and Eve are placed at the fixed coordinates
(0.00, 0.50), (0.50, 0.50), (1.00, 0.50), (0.99, 0.50) as shown in Fig. 4.11. Considered
the case of N = 10 system nodes for 10, 000 iterations, the probability of intercept
by Eve is averaged for various γ1, where γT = 0.3, and γ2 = γT − γ1. The eaves-
dropper is a major security threat to link2, therefore it is very desirable to allocate
most of the outage to γ2 to minimize the end-to-end probability of intercept.
Consider the performance of toy example #1; Fig. 4.12. Recall that the source,
relay and the destination are located at coordinates (0.00, 0.50), (0.50, 0.50), and
(1.00, 0.50) respectively. The eavesdropper is placed particularly close to the source,
which represents an extremely vulnerable state for the first hop, link 1. On the
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other hand because the eavesdropper is very far away geometrically from link
2, the probability of intercept is significantly less probable; low security concern.
Since the goal is tominimize the probability of intercept by the eavesdropper, given
the freedom to choose the probability of outage (reliability) on link 1 and link 2, γ1
should receive a large allocation of the outage constraint in order to minimize the
probability of intercept at the eavesdropper because of the high chance that the
eavesdropper gets the message on the first hop. Similarly in Fig. 4.13 we consider
the case where the eavesdropper was located extremely close to the destination, as
a result majority of the outage allocation is given to γ2 to minimize the end-to-end
probability of intercept of the message.
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Figure 4.12: Alice, relay, Bob, and Eve are placed at the fixed coordinates
(0.00, 0.50), (0.50, 0.50), (1.00, 0.50), (0.01, 0.50) as shown in Fig. 4.10a. Consid-
ered the case of N = 10 chatters for 10, 000 iterations, the probability of intercept
by Eve is averaged for various γ1, where γT = 0.3, and γ2 = γT − γ1. The eaves-
dropper is a major security threat to link1; therefore, it is very desirable to allocate
most of the outage to γ1 to minimize the probability of intercept.
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Figure 4.13: Source, relay, destination, and Eve are placed at the fixed coordinates
(0.0, 0.50), (0.50, 0.50), (1.00, 0.50), (0.99, 0.50) as shown in Fig. 4.10b. Considered
the case of N = 10 system nodes, for 10, 000 iterations, the probability of intercept
at Eve is averaged for various γ1, where γT = 0.3, and γ2 = γT − γ1. The eaves-
dropper is a major security threat to link2; therefore, it is very desirable to allocate
most of the outage to γ2 to minimize the probability of intercept.
These results are summarized in Table 4.2, where savings in the probability of
intercept by Eve is shown using our approach in determining the optimal γ1,γ2 for
each link in comparison to equally choosing γ1 and γ2. For the case of the eaves-
dropper being close to the source or the destination, we can reduce the probability
of intercept by Eve by 60% and 42% respectively.
In Fig. 4.14, we consider the case of the end-to-end probability of intercept sav-
ings by Eve as a function of Eve distance from the source for a moderately dense
network (N = 20) and dense network (N = 50). The most savings is achieved
when Eve is either close to the source or close to the destination, mainly because
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Figure 4.14: Alice, relay, and Bob are placed at the fixed coordinates (0.0, 0.50),
(0.50, 0.50), (1.00, 0.50). Considered the case of N = 20 and N = 0 system nodes,
for 10, 000 iterations, savings in the probability of intercept by Eve in our optimal
outage allocation for γ1, γ2 in comparison to equal outage allocation (γ1 = γ2),
as a function of the distance from Alice to Eve. When Eve is either very close to
the source or furthest away from the source yields the most savings. On the other
hand, when Eve is equally away from Alice as it is from the Relay, equal outage
allocation is optimal since the eavesdropper does not favor a link.
that is when Eve favors a particular link. The savings decreases as the coordi-
nate changes from 0.1 to 0.5 because Eve is approaching closer to the relay node.
Whereas as the coordinate changes from 0.5 to 1.0 Eve is getting further away from
the relay.
4.5 Conclusion
Communication between a source and destination in the presence of a pas-
sive eavesdropper is considered. System nodes other than the source and destina-
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Scenario P
(T)∗
int γ
∗
1 γ
∗
2 Savings
Close to Source 0.0120 0.2740 0.0260 60%
Close to Destination 0.0792 0.0260 0.2740 42%
Table 4.2: This table shows the optimal end-to-end intercept probabilities with cor-
responding receiver outage constraints on link 1 (γ1) and link 2 (γ2) for the toy
problems described when the number of system nodes, N = 10. The last column
is the savings in the intercept probability for the optimal (γ1,γ2) in comparison to
if the outage constraint was equally split for both links. There is significant gain
for carefully selecting γ1,γ2 as described.
tion generate random chatter to aid in the secret transmission of the message. In
contrast to maintaining a pair of received signal-to-noise-plus-interference ratios
(SINR) such that the secrecy rate equation is satisfied, we argue that maintaining
separate SINR thresholds at the receiver and eavesdropper will be required if a
single wiretap code is employed. This naturally leads to a formulation where the
SINR threshold at the receiver is met with equality, while the probability that the
SINR threshold is met at the eavesdropper is maximized. With an appropriate
change of variables, optimal power allocation to the systems nodes that generate
random chatter can be achieved via a water-filling approach. Numerical results
indicate that, even with this optimum power allocation, the eavesdropping proba-
bility is intolerably high if zero outage must be maintained at the receiver. Hence,
we consider allowing a small outage at the receiver, which greatly reduces the
eavesdropping probability. We note that allocating power to only a single chat-
tering node often does not result in a significant reduction in performance versus
the optimal allocation. Lastly, we considered the two-hop network, figuring out
the optimal outage constraint to each link given an end-to-end outage constraint.
Importantly, we defined the “trouble link” as a link that had an eavesdropper with
a high probability to intercept the message, e.g. as a result of being close to a trans-
mitting node. For this case it was shown that there is significant gain in secrecy
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performance using our outage allocation scheme rather than equally partitioning
the outage to each link.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this dissertation we have considered two main areas of concern in wireless
communications: wideband receiver design and security. We first studied ultra-
wideband (UWB), a promising communications technique that helps resolve the
frequency allocation problem that often inhibits narrowband systems. We uni-
fied reference-based noncoherent receivers into one general framework for perfor-
mance evaluation to consider the optimal set of waveforms under various con-
straints and the comparison of the prominent systems. We contributed sample-
and-hold techniques and halving the frequency offset to optimize Frequency Shifted
Reference (FSR-UWB) to improve performance in the case of an average power
constraint. Next we optimized multi-data rate systems that faced a peak power
constraint by applying a novel form of tone reservation. The latter contribution is
different than traditional tone reservation seen in orthogonal frequency division
multiplexing (OFDM) because peak reducing “dummy” carriers are added above
the coherence frequency, thus not sacrificing data rate or system performance.
We also have considered the important topic of security in wireless commu-
nications. Most modern wireless systems use cryptography, which typically re-
lies on a secret key shared by trusted parities and complex algorithms to hide a
message from an eavesdropper. However, in this dissertation we have considered
information-theoretic approaches because they guarantee everlasting security. We
considered the selection of code parameters for the case of communication from
Alice (the transmitter) to Bob (the intended recipient) in the presence of Eve (an
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eavesdropper) when all channels experience multipath fading whose values are
not known at the transmitter. In particular we provided a new secrecy outage
formulation, where rather than only define secrecy outage with one degree of free-
dom, the target secrecy rate threshold as in the standard formulation, we defined
secrecy outage as an individual rate pair with two degrees of freedom. In the con-
struction of the new outage formulation, we noted that two secrecy outage regions
emerged that violated the secrecy rate pair outage formulation but were not equal
in consequence. In the first event, the target secrecy rate was met but the eaves-
dropper and destination rates were higher than the designed wiretap code, which
is disastrous because the eavesdropper intercepts the packet: the system is inse-
cure. In the other event, the instantaneous rates of the eavesdropper and the des-
tination channels are lower than the designed wiretap code but we can exploit the
use of automatic retransmission (ARQ)while maintaining the intercept probability
of the eavesdropper below the desired threshold. We then introduced a sophisti-
cated hybrid ARQ receiver, where a buffer was used to combine incomplete pack-
ets from previous transmissions to improve reliability. Secrecy with hybrid ARQ
showed good system performance, especially as the eavesdropper distance from
the source increased. Next, the two-hop case was considered where the goal was
to determine the secrecy rate pair on each link with the corresponding intercept
probability constraints given only the end-to-end intercept probability constraint.
We contributed a binary search algorithm to efficiently find the optimal rate pairs
on both links for various intercept probability constraints to result in the maximum
end-to-end throughput.
Last, motivated by the weakness of secrecy with ARQ in certain scenarios the
near eavesdropper case was investigated. We considered the power allocation to
nearby “chatter” nodes that amplify artificial noise to disrupt the eavesdropper
but not significantly affect the SINR of the main communication. This contribu-
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tion resulted in a water-filling approach, where we put power into nodes that had a
good fade and close distance to the eavesdropper while being far away and having
a bad fade to the destination. Under some circumstances this resulted in an unsat-
isfactory intercept probability of Eve, which we improved by allowing outage at
the destination to significantly reduce the intercept probability to Eve. Later we
extended this work to the two-hop case, with an end-to-end outage constraint. We
optimized the outage allocated to each link and showed that the outage constraint
should be budgeted to the “trouble link” to maximize secrecy performance.
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APPENDIX A
NOISE ANALYSIS OF UNIFIED FRAMEWORK
In this appendix, the second moments of the “signal cross noise” term in (2.12)
are evaluated.
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
K=0
φ2k(t)φ
2
f (t)dt (A.1)
Noise Cross Noise Analysis:
E[(
∫ Ts
0
n2(t)φk(t))
2 ]
(1)
=
∫ Ts
0
∫ Ts
0
E[n(t)n(t)n(s)n(s)]φk(t)φk(s)dsdt
= R2n(0)
∫ Ts
0
φk(t)dt
∫ Ts
0
φk(s)ds + 2
∫ Ts
0
∫ Ts
0
R2n(s− t)φk(t)φk(s)dsdt
= 2
∫ Ts
0
∫ Ts
0
R2n(s− t)φk(t)φk(s)dsdt
(2)
= TsN
2
0W (A.2)
where Rn(τ) denotes the autocorrelation function of the wideband noise process
n(t),
(1)
= comes from the standard decomposition of the expectation of the product
of four Gaussian random variables, and
(2)
= comes from Parsevals Theorem. Signal
Cross Noise Analysis:
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E[(2
∫ Ts
0
x(t)n(t)φk(t)dt)
2 ]
= 4
∫ Ts
0
∫ Ts
0
x(t)x(s)Rn(t− s)φk(t)φk(s)dsdt
(1)
= 4
∫ Ts
0
∫ Ts
0
u(t)u(s)Rn(t− s)φk(t)φk(s)dsdt
(2)≈ 4
Nf−1
∑
n=0
x2env(t)(nTf )φ
2
k(nTf )
∫ Ts
0
p(t− nTf )p(s − nTf )Rn(t− s)dsdt
(3)≈ 2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
x2env(t)(t)φ
2
k (t)dt
=
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
[
√
Eru(t) +
K−1
∑
m=0
(−1)b(m)0
√
E
(m)
d φm(t)u(t)]
2φ2k(t)dt (A.3)
where
(1)
= follows because the support of Rn(τ), is far less than Tf − Tp, (2)= and (3)=
follow because of the limited support of the autocorrelation function Rn() of the
wideband process n(t). For simplification we evaluate the above integral in (A.3)
term by term:
2N0Er
Ts
∫ Ts
0
φ2k(t)dt = 2ErN0 (A.4)
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
b(m)0
√
ErE
(m)
d φm(t)φ
2
k (t)dt = 0 (A.5)
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
(b(m)0 )
2E
(m)
d φ
2
m(t)φ
2
k (t)dt
+
2N0
Ts
∫ Ts
0
K−1
∑
m=0
K−1
∑
m ̸=n
b
(m)
0 b
(n)
0
√
E
(m)
d E
(n)
d φm(t)φn(t)φ
2
k (t)dt (A.6)
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APPENDIX B
NECESSITY CONDITIONS FOR SECRECY WITH ARQ
(TWO-HOP CASE)
The method of Lagrange multipliers is introduced to maximize the overall se-
crecy throughput of the end-to-end path while constraining the total end-to-end
intercept probability (secrecy with ARQ two-hop optimization problem):
max
τEi,τBi
f (τEi, τBi) = (1− e−τBi)
[
log2
(
PsτBi + N0d
α
S,Bi
N0dαS,Bi
)
− log2
(
PsτEi + N0d
α
S,Ei
N0dαS,Ei
)]
s.t. h(τEi, τBi) =
2
∑
i=1
e−τEi
1− (1− e−τBi)(1− e−τEi ) = ϵT (B.1)
Set the derivations ▽F(τEj , τBj) + λ▽ H(τEj , τBj) = 0, which yields the system of
equations (necessity conditions) below respectively:
−
(
e
−τBj
[
log2
(
PsτBj + N0d
α
S,Bj
N0dαS,Bj
)
− log2
(
PsτEj + N0d
α
S,Ej
N0dαS,Ej
)]
+
(
1− e−τBj
) Ps
PsτBj + N0d
α
S,Bj
)
= λ
(
−e−τEj (e−τEj e−τBj − e−τBj)
(e
−τBj + e−τEj − e−τEj e−τBj)2
)
(B.2)
(
1− e−τBj
) Ps
PsτEj + N0d
α
S,Ej
= λ
(−e−τEj (−e−τEj + e−τEj e−τBj)
(e
−τBj + e−τEj − e−τEj e−τBj)2
− e
−τEj
(e
−τEj + e−τBj − e−τEj e−τBj)
)
(B.3)
e
−τEj
e
−τEj + e−τBj − e−τEj e−τBj
− ϵT = 0 (B.4)
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First solving (B.4) for τEj yields :
e
−τEj = ϵe
−τBj
1− ϵ+ ϵe−τBj
τEj = τBj − log2
ϵ
1− ϵ+ ϵe−τBj
(B.5)
Next we substitute (B.5) into (B.3) where an analytical solution for τBj could not be
found.
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